Preference evolution and reciprocity

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 273-297

  Sethi, Rajiv ^a   Somanathan, E ^b  

^a Barnard College of Columbia University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution; Preference interdependence; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035315326     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2683     Document Type: Article

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