Getting to know you: Reputation and trust in a two-person economic exchange

Science

Volumn 308, Issue 5718, 2005, Pages 78-83

  King Casas, Brooks ^a   Tomlin, Damon ^a   Anen, Cedric ^b   Camerer, Colin F ^b   Quartz, Steven R ^b   Montague, P Read ^a  

^a BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRELATION METHODS; DATA REDUCTION; ERROR ANALYSIS; FUNCTIONS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

ECONOMIC EXCHANGE; LEARNING MODELS; NEURAL RESPONSE; RESPONSE MAGNITUDE;

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS;

BEHAVIOR; NEUROLOGY;

ARTICLE; CORPUS STRIATUM; ERROR; FUTUROLOGY; LEARNING; MODEL; NERVE POTENTIAL; NONHUMAN; NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REINFORCEMENT; STIMULUS RESPONSE; ASSOCIATION; BEHAVIOR; CAUDATE NUCLEUS; GAME; HEMODYNAMICS; HUMAN; PHYSIOLOGY; REWARD; STATISTICAL MODEL; TRUST; VASCULARIZATION;

CAUDATE NUCLEUS; CUES; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HEMODYNAMIC PROCESSES; HUMANS; INTENTION; LINEAR MODELS; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; REWARD; TRUST;

EID: 15944412100     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1108062     Document Type: Article

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39. This work was supported by the Center for Theoretical Neuroscience at Baylor College of Medicine (P.R.M.), National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) grant DA11723 (P.R.M.), National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke grant NS045790 (P.R.M.), National Institute of Mental Health grant MH52797 (P.R.M.), NIDA grant DA14883 (G. Berns), The Kane Family Foundation (P.R.M.), The David and Lucile Packard Foundation (S.R.Q.), and The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (S.R.Q.). We thank P. Dayan, J. Li, T. Lohrenz, C. Stetson, and two anonymous referees for comments on this manuscript. We thank the Hyperscan Development Team at Baylor College of Medicine for Network Experiment Management Object (NEMO) software implementation (www.hnl.bcm.tmc edu/nemo) and C. Berns for early discussions and efforts leading to the development of hyperscanning. We also thank A. Harvey, S. Flaherty, K. Pfeiffer, R. Pruitt, and S. Gleason for technical assistance.