Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the Traveler's Dilemma

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 303, Issue , 2012, Pages 119-127

  Manapat, Michael L ^a,b   Rand, David G ^a,c   Pawlowitsch, Christina ^d   Nowak, Martin A ^a,e  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^d PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^e HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary game theory; Social dilemmas; Stochastic game theory

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; NUMERICAL MODEL; STOCHASTICITY;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; ECONOMICS; EVOLUTION; GAME; MUTATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; STATISTICAL ANALYSIS; STATISTICAL MODEL; STOCHASTIC EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS; TRAVELER DILLEMA;

ANIMALS; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, GENETIC; MUTATION; MUTATION RATE; SELECTION, GENETIC; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES;

EID: 84860591361     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.014     Document Type: Article

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