Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists

ACM Computing Surveys

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2011, Pages

  Parsons, Simon ^a   Rodriguez Aguilar, Juan A ^b   Klein, Mark ^c  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IIIA CSIC   (Spain)

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Resource allocation

Indexed keywords

EDUCATION COMPUTING;

AUCTION; AUCTION THEORY; COMPUTER SCIENTISTS; DOUBLE SIDED; ELECTRONIC AUCTION; MULTI DIMENSIONAL; RESOURCES ALLOCATION; SEALED BIDS; TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDING;

COMMERCE;

EID: 79551706077     PISSN: 03600300     EISSN: 15577341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1883612.1883617     Document Type: Article

References (180)

1. AN, N., ELMAGHRABY, W., AND KESKINOCAK, P. 2005. Bidding strategies and their impact on revenues in combinatorial auctions. J. Rev. Pric. Manage. 3, 4, 337-357.
2. ANDERSSON, A., TENHUNEN, M., AND YGGE, F. 2000. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Multiagent Systems, E. Durfee, S.
3. ARCHER, A., PAPADIMITRIOU, C., TALWAR, K., AND TARDOS, E. 2003. An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agent. Internet Math. 1, 2, 129-150.
4. AUSUBEL, L. M. 1997. An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. Working paper 97-06, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.
5. AUSUBEL, L. M. AND CRAMTON, P. 1998. Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions. Working paper 96-07, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.
6. AUSUBEL, L. M. AND MILGROM, P. 2001. Ascending auctions with package bidding. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.
7. BABAIOFF, M. AND WALSH, W. 2005. Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation. Decision Support Syst. 39, 123-149.
8. BAJARI, P. AND YE, L. 2003. Deciding between competition and collusion. Rev. Econ. Stat. 85, 4, 971-989. (Pubitemid 37417031)
9. BBC NEWS. 2001. Sotheby's and Christie's chiefs charged. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/ onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/2/newsid2480000/2480711. stm.
10. BICHLER, M. 2000. An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions. Decision Support Syst. 29, 3, 249-268.
11. BICHLER, M. 2001. The Future of e-Markets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
12. BICHLER, M. AND KALAGNANAM, J. 2005. Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions. Europ. J. Oper. Res. 160, 380-394.
13. BICHLER, M., LEE, J., KIM, C., AND LEE, H. 2001. Design and implementation of an intelligent decision analysis system for e-sourcing. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
14. BOGDANOVYCH, A. 2008. Virtual institutions. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Technology Sydney.
15. BOUTILIER, C. AND HOOS, H. H. 2001. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Morgan-Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA, 1211-1217.
16. BRANCO, F. 1997. The design of multidimensional auctions. RAND J. Econ. 28, 1, 63-81.
17. BULOW, J. AND KLEMPERER, P. 2002. Prices and the winner's curse. RAND J. Econ. 33, 1, 1-21.
18. BUSSMANN, S., JENNINGS, N., AND WOOLDRIDGE, M. 2004. Multiagent Systems for Manufacturing Control: A Design Methodology. Series on Agent Technology. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany.
19. BUSSMANN, S. AND SCHILD, K. 2000. Self-organizing manufacturing control: An industrial application of agent technology. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Multiagent Systems, E. Durfee, S. Kraus, H. Nakashima, and M. Tambe, Eds. IEEE Computer Society, 87-94.
20. CARNEY, T. F. 1971. The Economies of Antiquity. Coronado Press, Lawrence, KS.
21. CASSADY, JR., R. 1967. Auctions and Auctioneering. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
22. CERQUIDES, J., ENDRISS, U., GIOVANNUCCI, A., AND RODRIGUEZ-AGUILAR, J. A. 2007a. Bidding languages and winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, M. M. Veloso, Ed. Hyderabad, India, 1221-1227.
23. CERQUIDES, J., REYES-MORO, A., RODRIGUEZ-AGUILAR, J. A., AND LÓPEZ-SÁNCHEZ, M. 2007b. Enabling assisted strategic negotiations in actual-world procurement scenarios. Electron. Comm. Res. 7, 3/4, 189-220.
24. CHE, Y. K. 1993. Design competition through multidimensional auctions. RAND J. Econ. 24, 4, 668-680.
25. CLARKE, E. H. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11, 17-33.
26. CLIFF, D. 1997. Minimal-intelligence agents for bargaining behaviours in market-based environments. Tech. rep. HP-97-91, Hewlett-Packard Research Laboratories, Bristol, England.
27. CONITZER, V. 2008. Mechanism design for MAS. Course at the Dubai Agents and Multiagent Systems School.
28. CONITZER, V. AND SANDHOLM, T. 2002. Complexity of mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 18th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, A. Darwiche and N. Friedman, Eds. Morgan, Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA.
29. CONITZER, V. AND SANDHOLM, T. 2004. Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York.
30. CONITZER, V. AND SANDHOLM, T. 2006. Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, H. Nakashima, M. P. Wellman, G. Weiss, and P. Stone, Eds. ACM, New York, 521-528. (Pubitemid 46613749)
31. CRAMTON, P. 1997. The FCC spectrum auctions: An early assessment. J. Econ. Manage. Strat. 6, 3, 431-495. (Pubitemid 127353494)
32. CRAMTON, P. 2002. Spectrum auctions. In Handbook of Telecommunications Economics,M. Cave, S. Majumdar, and I. Vogelsang, Eds., Elsevier, Amsterdam, Chapter 14, 605-639.
33. CRAMTON, P. AND SCHWARTZ, J. 1998. Collusive bidding in the FCC spectrum auctions. Working paper, University of Maryland.
34. CRAMTON, P. AND SCHWARTZ, J. 2000. Collusive bidding: Lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions. J. Regulat. Econ. 17, 3, 229-252.
35. CRAMTON, P., SHOHAM, Y., AND STEINBERG, R., EDS. 2006. Combinatorial Auctions. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
36. DAS, R., HANSON, J. E., KEPHART, J. O., AND TESAURO, G. 2001. Agent-human interactions in the continuous double auction. In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, B. Nebel, Ed. Morgan-Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA, 1169-1187.
37. DASH, R. K., PARKES, D. C., AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2003. Computational mechanism design: A call to arms. IEEE Intell. Syst. 18, 6, 40-47.
38. DASH, R. K., RAMCHURN, S. D., AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2004. Trust-based mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, N. R. Jennings, C. Sierra, L. Sonenberg, and M. Tambe, Eds. ACM, New York, 748-755.
39. DE VRIES, S. AND VOHRA, R. 2003. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS J. Comput. 15, 3, 284-309. (Pubitemid 39042722)
40. ECONOMIDES, N. AND SCHWARTZ, R. A. 1995. Electronic call market trading. J. Portfolio Manage. 21, 3, 10-18.
41. ENGEL, Y., WELLMAN, M. P., AND LOCHNER, K. M. 2006. Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 110-119. (Pubitemid 44393630)
42. ENGELBRECHT-WIGGANS, R. 1980. Auctions and bidding models: A survey.Manage. Sci. 26, 119-142.
43. FINK, E., JOHNSON, J., AND HU, J. 2004. Exchange market for complex goods: Theory and experiments. Netnomics 6, 1, 21-42.
44. FRIEDMAN, D. 1993. The double auction institution: A survey. In The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA, Chapter 1, 3-25.
45. FRIEDMAN, D. AND RUST, J.,EDS. 1993a. The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA.
46. FRIEDMAN, D. AND RUST, J. 1993b. Preface. In The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA, 199-219.
47. FRIEDMAN, E. J. AND PARKES, D. C. 2003. Pricing wifi at Starbucks: Issues in online mechanism design. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 240-241.
48. FUJISHIMA, Y., MCADAMS, D., AND SHOHAM, Y. 1999. Speeding up ascending bid auctions. In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, T. Dean, Ed. 548-553.
49. GARCÍA, B. M. AND VIDAL, J. M. 2007. Bidding algorithms for a distributed combinatorial auction. In Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, E. H. Durfee, M. Yokoo, M. N. Huhns, and O. Shehory, Eds. IFAAMAS, 694-701.
50. GE. 2000. Letter to Share owners. Annual report, General Electric Corporation.
51. GERDING, E., MCBURNEY, P., NIU, J., PARSONS, S., AND PHELPS, S. 2007a. Overview of CAT: A market design competition. Tech. rep. ULCS-07-006, Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool.
52. GERDING, E. H., ROGERS, A., DASH, R. K., AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2007b. Sellers competing for buyers in online markets: Reserve prices, shill bids, and auction fees. In Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, M. M. Veloso, Ed. Hyderabad, India, 1287-1293.
53. GIBBARD, A. 1973. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 41, 587-602.
54. GIOVANNUCCI, A., RODRÍGUEZ-AGUILAR, J. A., CERQUIDES, J., AND ENDRISS, U. 2007. On the winner determination problem in mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 6th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, E. H. Durfee, M. Yokoo, M. N. Huhns, and O. Shehory, Eds. IFAAMAS, 710-717.
55. GIOVANNUCCI, A., RODRÍGUEZ-AGUILAR, J. A., REYES, A., NORIA, F. X., AND CERQUIDES, J. 2004. Towards automated procurement via agent-aware negotiation support. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, ACM, New York, 244-251.
56. GIOVANNUCCI, A., VINYALS, M., RODRÍGUEZ-AGUILAR, J. A., AND CERQUIDES, J. 2008. Computationally-efficient winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, L. Padgham, D. Parkes, J. Müller, and S. Parsons, Eds. IFAAMAS, 1071-1078.
57. GJERSTAD, S. AND DICKHAUT, J. 1998. Price formation in double auctions. Games Econ. Behaviour 22, 1-19.
58. GOEREE, J. K. AND OFFERMAN, T. 2004. The Amsterdam auction. Ecomometrica 72, 1, 281-294.
59. GOITEN, S. D. 1967. A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza. Vol. 1, Economic Foundations. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles.
60. GONEN, R. AND LEHMANN, D. 2000. Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: Branch and bound heuristics. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 13-20.
61. GONG, J. 2002. Exchanges for complex commodities: Search for optimalmatches.M.S. dissertation. University of South Florida.
62. GRAHAM, D. A. AND MARSHALL, R. C. 1987. Collusive bidder behaviour at single-object second-price and English auctions. J. Polit. Econ. 95, 579-599.
63. GREEN, J. R. AND LAFFONT, J.-J. 1979. On coalition incentive compatibility. Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 243-254.
64. GREENWALD, A. AND STONE, P. 2001. Autonomous bidding agents in the Trading Agent Competition. IEEE Internet Comput. 5, 2, 52-60. (Pubitemid 32380529)
65. GREENWALD, A. R. AND KEPHART, J. O. 1999. Shopbots and pricebots. In Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, T. Dean, Ed. Stockholm, Sweden, 506-511.
66. GROVES, T. 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41, 617-631.
67. HANSELL, S. 2004. Google's slow search for a good share price. New York Times: Business Day.
68. HASBROUCK, J., SOFIANOS, G., AND SOSEBESS, D. 1993. New York Stock Exchange systems and trading procedures. Working paper 93-01, New York Stock Exchange.
69. HEALEY, C. G., AMANT, R. S., AND CHANG, J. 2001. Assisted visualization of e-commerce auction agents. In Proceedings of Graphics Interface. 201-208. (Pubitemid 34104017)
70. HOOS, H. H. AND BOUTILIER, C. 2000. Solving combinatorial auctions using stochastic local search. In Proceedings of the 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, 22-29.
71. HUBERMAN, B. A. AND CLEARWATER, S. H. 1995. A multi-agent system for controlling building environments. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Multiagent Systems, V. R. Lesser and L. Gasser, Eds. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 171-176.
72. HUNSBERGER, L. AND GROSZ, B. 2000. A combinatorial auction for collaborative planning. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Multiagent Systems, E. Durfee, S. Kraus, H. Nakashima, andM. Tambe, Eds. IEEE Computer Society, 151-158.
73. HURWICZ, L. 1972. On informationally decentralized systems. In Decision and Organisation: A Volume in Honour of Jacob Marchak, C. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds. North-Holland.
74. HURWICZ, L. 1975. On the existence of allocation systems whose manipulative Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal. Unpublished manuscript.
75. HURWICZ, L. AND WALKER,M. 1990. On the generic nonoptimality of dominant-strategy allocation mechanisms: A general theorem that includes pure exchange economies. Econometrica 58, 683-704.
76. JACKSON, M. O. 2003. Mechanism theory. In Optimization and Operations Research, U. Devigs, Ed. The Encyclopedia of Life Support Science. EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK.
77. JENNINGS, N. AND BUSSMANN, S. 2003. Agent-based control systems. IEEE Control Syst. Mag. 23, 3, 61-74.
78. KAHN, A. E., CRAMTON, P. C., PORTER, R. H., AND TABORS, R. D. 2001. Pricing in the California power exchange electricity market: Should California switch from uniform pricing to pay-as-bid pricing? Blue Ribbon Panel report, commissioned by the California Power Exchange.
79. KALAGNANAM, J., DAVENPORT, A., AND LEE, H. 2000. Computational aspects of clearing continuous call double auctions with assignment constraints and indivisible demand. Tech. rep. RC21660(97613), IBM.
80. KALAGNANAM, J. AND PARKES, D. C. 2004. Auctions, bidding and exchange design. In Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the E-Business Era, D. Simchi-Levi, S. D. Wu, and M. Shen, Eds. International Series in Operations Research and Management Science. Kluwer, Chapter 5.
81. KELLY, F. AND STENBERG, R. 2000. A combinatorial auction withmultiple winners for universal service. Manage. Sci. 46, 4, 586-596.
82. KLEMPERER, P. 1998. Auctions with almost common values: The "wallet game" and its applications. Europ. Econ. Rev. 42, 3-5, 757-769. (Pubitemid 128713812)
83. KLEMPERER, P. 2002a. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. J. Econ. Surv. 13, 3, 227-286. (Reprinted as Chapter 1 of Klemperer [2004]). (Pubitemid 29392123)
84. KLEMPERER, P. 2002b. How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions. European Econ. Rev. 46, 4/5, 829-845. (Pubitemid 34580830)
85. KLEMPERER, P. 2002c. What really matters in auction design. J. Econ. Perspec. 16, 169-189.
86. KLEMPERER, P. 2004. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press.
87. LEE, J. 2002. Making losers of auction winners. The New York Times.
88. LEE, J., BICHLER, M., VERMA, S., AND LEE, H. 2000. Design and implementation of an interactive visual analysis system for e-sourcing. Tech. rep. RC22045, IBM.
89. LEHMANN, D., MÜLLER, R., AND SANDHOLM, T. 2006. The winner determination problem. In Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 12, 297-317.
90. LESKELÄ, R.-L., TEICH, J. E., WALLENIUS, H., AND WALLENIUS, J. 2007. Decision support for multi-unit combinatorial bundle auctions. Decision Support Syst. 43, 2, 420-434. (Pubitemid 46216545)
91. LÉVY, J. 1967. The Economic Life of the Ancient World. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
92. LEYTON-BROWN, K., NUDELMAN, E., AND SHOHAM, Y. 2006. Empirical hardnessmodels for combinatorial auctions. In Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 19, 479-504.
93. LEYTON-BROWN, K. AND SHOHAM, Y. 2006. A test-suite for combinatorial auctions. In Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 18, 451-478.
94. LEYTON-BROWN, K., SHOHAM, Y., AND TENNENHOLTZ, M. 2002. Bidding clubs in first-price auctions. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, San Matteo, CA, 373-378.
95. LUCKING-REILEY, D. 2000. Auctions on the internet: What's being auctioned, and how? J. Industr. Econ. 48, 227-252.
96. MACKIE-MASON, J. K. AND VARIAN, H. R. 1994. Generalized Vickrey auctions. Tech. rep., Department of Economics, University of Michigan.
97. MASKIN, E. S. AND RILEY, J. G. 1985. Auction theory with private values. Amer. Econ. Rev. 75, 150-155.
98. MASKIN, E. S. AND SJ ÖSTRÖM, T. 2002. Implementation theory. In Handbook of Social Choice Theory and Welfare, K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura, Eds. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
99. MCAFEE, R. P. AND MCMILLAN, J. 1987. Auctions and bidding. J. Econ. Lit. 25, 2, 699-738.
100. MCAFEE, R. P. AND MCMILLAN, J. 1996. Analyzing the airwaves auction. J. Econ. Perspect. 10, 159-176.
101. MCCABE, K. A.,RASSENTI, S. J., AND SMITH, V. L. 1993. Designing a uniform-price double auction: An experimental evaluation. In The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Thories and Evndence, Pervious Publishing, Cambridge, MA, 307-332.
102. MCMILLAN, J. 1994. Selling spectrum rights. J. Econ. Perspect. 8, 191-199.
103. MENEZES, F. 1996. Multiple-unit English auctions. Europ. J. Polit. Econ. 12, 4, 671-684. (Pubitemid 126164819)
104. MILGROM, P. 1989. Auctions and bidding: A primer. J. Econ. Perspect. 3, 3, 3-22.
105. MILGROM, P. 2000. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. J. Polit. Econ. 108, 245-272. (Pubitemid 30318773)
106. MILGROM, P. AND WEBER, R. 1982. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica 50, 1089-1122.
107. MONDERER, D. AND TENNENHOLTZ, M. 1999. Distributed games. Games Econ. Behav. 28, 1, 55-72.
108. MONDERER, D. AND TENNENHOLTZ, M. 2000. k-price auctions. Games Econom. Behav. 31, 1-2, 220-244.
109. MORITA, T., YUITOU, M., HIDAKA, T., AND HIRAKAWA, Y. 2005. Visualization methods using three-dimensional space for auctions. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops. 396-399. (Pubitemid 46402159)
110. MU'ALEM, A. AND NISAN, N. 2002. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, San Matteo, CA, 379-384.
111. MÜLLER, R. 2006. Tractable cases of the winner determination problem. In Combinational Auctions, Chapter 13, 319-336.
112. MURNIGHAN, J. K. 1992. Bargaining Games. William Murrow and Company.
113. MYERSON, R. B. 1981. Optimal auction design.Math. Oper. Res. 6, 1, 58-73.
114. NARUMANCHI, M. V. AND VIDAL, J. M. 2006. Algorithms for distributed winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3937. Springer-Verlag, 43-56. (Pubitemid 44849960)
115. NISAN, N. 2000. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, 1-12.
116. NISAN, N. 2006. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Combinatonial Auctions, Chapter 9, 215-232.
117. NISAN, N. 2007. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists). In Algorithmic Game Theory, N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, Eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
118. NISAN, N. AND RONEN, A. 2007. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 29, 19-47. (Pubitemid 47477588)
119. NIU, J., CAI, K., GERDING, E.,MCBURNEY, P., AND PARSONS, S. 2008. Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: Insights from the 2007 TAC market design competition. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, L. Padgham, D. Parkes, J. Müller, and S. Parsons, Eds. IFAAMAS, 1079-1086.
120. OBJECTMANAGEMENT GROUP 2006. BPM 1.0: BPM business process modeling notation specification. Tech. rep., Object Management Group. (Final adopted specification.)
121. OSBORNE, M. J. AND RUBINSTEIN, A. 1994. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
122. OSTWALD, J., LESSER, V., AND ABDALLAH, S. 2005. Combinatorial auction for resource allocation in a distributed sensor network. In Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS'05). IEEE Computer Society, 266-274.
123. PARKES, D. 1999. iBundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 148-157.
124. PARKES, D. 2000. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce II: Towards Next-Generation Agent-Based Electronic Commerce Systems, F. Y. A. Moukas, C. Sierra, Ed. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1788. Springer Verlag, Berlin, 206-219.
125. PARKES, D. 2001. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Achieving economic and computational efficiency. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania.
126. PARKES, D., CAVALLO, R., ELPRIN, N., JUDA, A., LAHAIE, S., LUBIN, B., MICHAEL, L., SHNEIDMAN, J., AND SULTAN, H. 2005. ICE: An iterative combinatorial exchange. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 249-258. (Pubitemid 43048685)
127. PARKES, D. AND KALAGNANAM, J. 2005. Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions. Manage. Sci. 51, 435-451. (Pubitemid 40611821)
128. PARKES, D., KALAGNANAM, J. R., AND ESO, M. 2001. Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges. In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, B. Nebel, Ed. Seattle, WA, 1161-1168.
129. PARKES, D. C. AND DUONG, Q. 2007. An ironing-based approach to adaptive online mechanism design in singlevalued domains. In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press, San Matteo, CA, 94-101. (Pubitemid 350149558)
130. PARSONS, S. 2002. Exception analysis for double auctions. Research Note, Center for Coordination Science, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
131. PARSONS, S., MARCINKIEWICZ, M., NIU, J., AND PHELPS, S. 2008. Everything you wanted to know about double auctions, but were afraid to (bid or) ask. Tech. rep., Department of Computer and Information Science, Brooklyn College.
132. PATEL, J., TEACY, W. T. L., JENNINGS, N. R., LUCK, M., CHALMERS, S., OREN, N., NORMAN, T. J., PREECE, A. D., GRAY, P. M. D., SHERCLIFF, G., STOCKREISSER, P. J., SHAO, J., GRAY, W. A., FIDDIAN, N. J., AND THOMPSON, S. G. 2005. Agent-based virtual organisations for the grid. In Proceedings of the 4th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, F. Dignum, V. Dignum, S. Koenig, S. Kraus, M. P. Singh, and M. Wooldridge, Eds. 1151-1152.
133. PESENDORFER, M. 2000. A study of collusion in first-price auctions. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67, 381-411.
134. PETCU, A., FALTINGS, B., AND PARKES, D. C. 2006. MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, H. Nakashima, M. P. Wellman, G. Weiss, and P. Stone, Eds. ACM, New York, 1397-1404. (Pubitemid 46609663)
135. PHELPS, S. 2008. Evolutionary mechanism design. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool.
136. PHELPS, S., CAI, K., MCBURNEY, P., NIU, J., PARSONS, S., AND SKLAR, E. 2008. Auctions, evolution, and multiagent learning. In Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems III, K. Tuyls, A. Nowe, Z. Guessoum, and D. Kudenko, Eds. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 4865. Springer Verlag, Berlin.
137. PORTER, R., RONEN, A., SHOHAM, Y., AND TENNENHOLTZ, M. 2002. Mechanism design with execution uncertainty. In Proceedings of the 18th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, A. Darwiche and N. Friedman, Eds. Morgan-Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA.
138. PORTER, R. H. AND ZONA, J. D. 1993. Detection of bid rigging in procurement auctions. J. Polit. Econ. 101, 3, 518-538.
139. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS. 2002. E-markets: Realism, not pessimism. http://pwcglobal.com/ebusinessinsights. (Aceessed 4/02).
140. PRINGSHEIM, F. 1949. The Greek sale by auction. In Scritti in Onore di Contardo Ferrini Pubblicati in Occasione della sua Beatificazione. Pubblicazioni dell' Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Nuova Serie, vol. XXVIII. Societa Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milan, 284-343.
141. RAMCHURN, S. D., MEZZETTI, C., GIOVANNUCCI, A., RODRIGUEZ-AGUILAR, J. A., DASH, R. K., AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2009. Trust-based mechanisms for robust and efficient task allocation in the presence of execution uncertainty. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 35, 1, 119-159.
142. RAMCHURN, S. D., ROGERS, A., MACARTHUR, K., FARINELLI, A., VYTELINGUM, P., VETSIKAS, I., AND JENNINGS, N. R. 2008. Agent-based coordination technologies in disaster management. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, L. Padgham, D. Parkes, J. Müller, and S. Parsons, Eds. IFAAMAS, 1651-1652.
143. RILEY, J. G. AND SAMUELSON, W. F. 1981. Optimal auctions. Amer. Econ. Rev. 71, 381-392.
144. ROTH, A. E. AND OCKENFELS, A. 2000. Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Theory and evidence from a natural experiment on the internet. Working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University.
145. RUST, J., MILLER, J. H., AND PALMER, R. 1994. Characterizing effective trading strategies. J. Econ. Dynam. Cont. 18, 61-96.
146. SANDHOLM, T. 2002. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artif. Intell. 135, 1-54. (Pubitemid 34110153)
147. SANDHOLM, T. 2003. Automatedmechanism design: A new application area for search algorithms. In Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, F. Rossi, Ed. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2833. Springer, Berlin, Germany, 19-36.
148. SANDHOLM, T. 2006. Optimal winner determination algorithms. In Combinatorial Auctions, P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and Steinberg, Eds. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
149. SANDHOLM, T. AND BOUTILIER, C. 2006. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Combinatonial Auctions, Chapter 10, 233-263.
150. SANDHOLM, T. AND GILPIN, A. 2006. Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, H. Nakashima, M. P. Wellman, G. Weiss, and P. Stone, Eds. ACM, New York, 1127-1134. (Pubitemid 46609612)
151. SANDHOLM, T. AND SURI, S. 2006. Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets. Games Econ. Behav. 55, 321-330. (Pubitemid 43585599)
152. SANDHOLM, T., SURI, S., GILPIN, A., AND LEVINE, D. 2002. Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. In Proceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. ACM, New York, 69-76. (Pubitemid 34975427)
153. SATTERTHWAITE, M. A. 1975. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J. Econ. Theory 10, 187-217.
154. SATTERTHWAITE, M. A. AND WILLIAMS, S. R. 1993. The Bayesian theory of the k-double auction. In The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories and Evidence. Perseus Publishing, Cambridge, MA, Chapter 4, 99-123.
155. SHOHAM, Y. 2000. A survey of auction types. Lecture notes: Stanford University CS206-Technical Foundations of Electronic Commerce.
156. SHOHAM, Y. 2001a. Auctions on the internet: what's actually happening. Lecture notes: Stanford University CS206-Technical Foundations of Electronic Commerce.
157. SHOHAM, Y. 2001b. Combinatorial auctions. Lecture notes: Stanford University CS206-Technical Foundations of Electronic Commerce.
158. SHOHAM, Y. 2001c. The zoology of auctions. Lecture notes: StanfordUniversity CS206-Technical Foundations of Electronic Commerce.
159. SHOHAM, Y. 2002. Combinatorial auctions. Lecture notes: Stanford University CS206-Technical Foundations of Electronic Commerce.
160. SHOHAM, Y. AND LEYTON-BROWN, K. 2008. Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
161. SIERRA, C., DE MANTARAS, R. L., AND BUSQUETS, D. 2000. Multiagent bidding mechanisms for robot qualitative navigation. In Intelligent Agents VII. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1986. 198-212. (Pubitemid 33314469)
162. SMITH, V. L. 1962. An experimental study of competitive market behaviour. J. Polit. Econ. 70, 2, 111-137.
163. SMITH, V. L. 1982. Microeconomic systems as an experimental science. Amer. Econ. Rev. 72, 5, 923-955.
164. SONG, J. AND REGAN, A. 2002a. Approximation algorithms for the bid construction problem in combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts. Tech. rep., ITS-CUI Working paper, University of California, Irvine.
165. SONG, J. AND REGAN, A. C. 2002b. Combinatorial auctions for transportation service procurement: the carrier perspective. Transport. Res. Rec. 1833, 40-46.
166. STARK, R. AND ROTHKOPF, M. H. 1979. Competitive bidding: A comprehensive bibliography. Oper. Res. 27, 364-391.
167. STROBEL, M. AND WEINHARDT, C. 2003. The Montreal taxonomy of electronic negotiations. Group Dec. Negot. 12, 143-164.
168. SUYAMA, T. AND YOKOO, M. 2005. Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction. Auton. Agents Multi-Agent Syst. 11, 1, 7-21. (Pubitemid 40878559)
169. TESAURO, G. AND DAS, R. 2001. High-performance bidding agents for the continuous double auction. In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 206-209.
170. THOMAS, J. A. C. 1957. The auction sale in Roman law. Judicial Rev., 42-66.
171. UCKELMAN, J. AND ENDRISS, U. 2008.Winner determination in combinatorial auctions with logic-based bidding languages. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, L. Padgham, D. Parkes, J. Müller, and S. Parsons, Eds. IFAAMAS, 1617-1618.
172. UNGERN-STERNBERG, T. V. 1991. Swiss auctions. Econometrica 58, 341-357.
173. VARIAN, H. R. 1995. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce. USENIX, New York.
174. VICKREY, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. J. Fin. 16, 1, 8-37.
175. VINYALS, M., GIOVANNUCCI, A., CERQUIDES, J.,MESEGUER, P., AND RODRIGUEZ-AGUILAR, J. A. 2008. A test suite for the evaluation of mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions. J. Algorithms 63, 1-3, 130-150.
176. WALTON, K. 2006. Fake: Forgery, Lies & eBay. Simon Spotlight Entertainment, New York.
177. WANG, X. AND XIA, M. 2005. Combinatorial bid generation problem for transportation service procurement. Transportation Research Record: J. Trans. Res. Board 1923, 189-198.
178. WELLMAN, M. 1993. A market-oriented programming environment and its application to distributed multicommodity flow problems. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 1, 1-23.
179. WELLMAN, M. P., GREENWALD, A., STONE, P., AND WURMAN, P. R. 2002. The 2001 trading agent competition. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 935-941.
180. WELLMAN, M. P., WURMAN, P. R., O'MALLEY, K., BANGERA, R., LIN, S., REEVES, D., AND WALSH, W. E. 2001. Designing the market game for a trading agent competition. IEEE Internet Comput. 5, 2, 43-51. (Pubitemid 32380528)