Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 1127-1134

  Sandholm, Tuomas ^a   Gilpin, Andrew ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Equilibrium computation; Multiagent systems; Optimal auction design; Perfect bayesian equilibrium

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS; OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN; PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM; VALUATION REVELATION;

ALGORITHMS; INFORMATION RETRIEVAL; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY OF DATA;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 34247227560     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160839     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (20)

1. Amazon.com. Gold box offers. http://www.amazon.com/gold-box, 2003.
2. S. Athey. Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information. Econometrics, 69(4):861-889, July 2001.
3. D. Bergemann and M. Pesendorfer. Information structures in optimal auctions. Discussion Paper 1323, Yale U., 2001.
4. A. Slum, T. Sandholm, and M. Zinkevich. Online algorithms for market clearing. In SODA-02, 2002.
5. L. Blumrosen and N. Nisan. Auctions with severely bounded communication. In FOC8-02, 2002.
6. L. Blumrosen, N. Nisan, and I. Segal. Multi-player and multi-round auctions with severely bounded communication. In ESA, pages 102-113, 2003.
7. V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Complexity of mechanism design. In UAI-02, pp. 103-110, 2002.
8. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. J. of Economic Theory, 53:236-260, 1991.
9. V. Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002.
10. K. Larson and T. Sandholm. Costly valuation computation in auctions. In TARK VIII, 2001.
11. R. Lavi and N. Nisan. Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. In ACM-EC, 2000.
12. P. Milgrom and R. Weber. Distributional strategies for games with incomplete infromation. Mathematics of Operations Research, 10:619-632, 1985.
13. R. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operation Research, 6:58-73, 1981.
14. M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In ACM-EC, 1999.
15. D. Parkes. Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce Workshop at IJCAI-99, Stockholm, 1999.
16. A. Ronen and A. Saberi. Optimal auctions are hard. In FOCS, pages 396-405, 2002.
17. M. Rothkopf, T. Teisberg, and E. Kahn. Why are Vickrey auctions rare? J. of Political Economy, 98(1):94-109, 1990.
18. T. Sandholm. An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost calculations. In AAAI, pages 256-262, Washington, D.C., July 1993.
19. T. Sandholm. Issues in computational Vickrey auctions. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 4(3):107-129, 2000. Special Issue on Applying Intelligent Agents for Electronic Commerce.
20. W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16, 1961.