Pricing WiFi at starbucks - Issues in online mechanism design

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 240-241

  Friedman, Eric J ^a   Parkes, David C ^b  

^a Cornell University   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTER NETWORKS; ECONOMICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; ONLINE SYSTEMS; PROBLEM SOLVING; WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; WORLD WIDE WEB;

ONLINE MODELS; PROBLEM COMPLEXITY; WIRELESS NETWORKS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0242539852     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (7)

1. A Archer and E. Tardos, Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proc. 42nd IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, 2001.
2. Joan Feigenbaum, Christos H Papadimitriou, and Scott Shenker. Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 63:21-41, 2001.
3. Eric Friedman and David C. Parkes, Pricing WiFi at Starbucks-Issues in online mechanism design. http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~parkes/pubs/online.pdf, 2002.
4. Jeremie Gallien. Dynamic mechanism design for online commerce. Technical report, Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, 2002.
5. Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.
6. Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan. Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. In Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), 2000.
7. Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 35: 166-196, 2001.