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Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 63-81

The design of multidimensional auctions

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EID: 0031506230     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555940     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (256)

References (19)
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  • 3
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    • Auctioning Incentive Contracts: The Common Cost, Independent Types Case
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  • 4
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    • Multiple Unit Auctions of an Indivisible Good
    • _. "Multiple Unit Auctions of an Indivisible Good." Economic Theory, Vol. 8 (1996), pp. 77-101.
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    • Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions
    • CHE, Y.-K. "Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 24 (1993), pp. 668-680.
    • (1993) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.24 , pp. 668-680
    • Che, Y.-K.1
  • 7
    • 0001146271 scopus 로고
    • Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
    • CRÉMER, J. AND MCLEAN, R.P. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions." Econometrica, Vol. 56 (1988), pp. 1247-1257.
    • (1988) Econometrica , vol.56 , pp. 1247-1257
    • Crémer, J.1    Mclean, R.P.2
  • 8
    • 0005466621 scopus 로고
    • The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case
    • CRIPPS, M. AND IRELAND, N. "The Design of Auctions and Tenders with Quality Thresholds: The Symmetric Case." Economic Journal, Vol. 104 (1994), pp. 316-326.
    • (1994) Economic Journal , vol.104 , pp. 316-326
    • Cripps, M.1    Ireland, N.2
  • 9
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    • A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm
    • GUESNERIE, R. AND LAFFONT, J.-J. "A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm." Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 25 (1984), pp. 329-369.
    • (1984) Journal of Public Economics , vol.25 , pp. 329-369
    • Guesnerie, R.1    Laffont, J.-J.2
  • 14
    • 0000096343 scopus 로고
    • Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
    • _, _, AND RENY, P.J. "Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction." Econometrica, Vol. 57 (1989), pp. 1451-1459.
    • (1989) Econometrica , vol.57 , pp. 1451-1459
    • Reny, P.J.1
  • 15
    • 0002970608 scopus 로고
    • Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
    • MYERSON, R.B. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem." Econometrica, Vol. 47 (1979), pp. 61-73.
    • (1979) Econometrica , vol.47 , pp. 61-73
    • Myerson, R.B.1
  • 16
    • 0347509614 scopus 로고
    • Optimal Auction Design
    • A. Rubinstein, ed., Aldershot, U.K.: Elgar
    • _. "Optimal Auction Design." In A. Rubinstein, ed., Game Theory in Economics. Aldershot, U.K.: Elgar, 1990.
    • (1990) Game Theory in Economics
  • 18
    • 38149143849 scopus 로고
    • A Mechanism Design Approach to Transfer Pricing by a Multinational Firm
    • STOUGHTON, N.M. AND TALMOR, E. "A Mechanism Design Approach to Transfer Pricing by a Multinational Firm." European Economic Review, Vol. 38 (1994), pp. 668-680.
    • (1994) European Economic Review , vol.38 , pp. 668-680
    • Stoughton, N.M.1    Talmor, E.2
  • 19
    • 38249032829 scopus 로고
    • Multidimensional Auctions
    • THIEL, S.E. "Multidimensional Auctions." Economics Letters, Vol. 28 (1988), pp. 37-40.
    • (1988) Economics Letters , vol.28 , pp. 37-40
    • Thiel, S.E.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.