Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 435-451

  Parkes, David C ^a   Kalagnanam, Jayant ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Ex post Nash equilibrium; Iterative auctions; Multiattribute negotiation; Price based feedback; Procurement; Straightforward bidding; Vickrey Clarke Groves mechanism

Indexed keywords

EX POST NASH EQUILIBRIUM; ITERATIVE AUCTIONS; MULTIATTRIBUTE NEGOTIATION; PRICE-BASED FEEDBACK; PROCUREMENT; STRAIGHTFORWARD BIDDING; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM;

COSTS; FEEDBACK; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

ITERATIVE METHODS;

EID: 18144419742     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0340     Document Type: Article

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