Distributed Games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 55-72

  Monderer, Dov ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010833055     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0689     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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