A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service

Management Science

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 586-596

  Kelly, Frank ^a   Steinberg, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Auctions; Carrier of last resort; Combinatorial bidding; Synergies; Telecommunications; Universal service

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; SALES;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; COMBINATORIAL BIDDING; UNIVERSAL SERVICES;

INTERNATIONAL TRADE;

EID: 0033728203     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.46.4.586.12054     Document Type: Article

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