Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 123-149

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Walsh, William E ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction; Budget balance; Combinatorial exchange; Incentive compatible; Mechanism design; Supply chain formation, mechanism design

Indexed keywords

BUDGET CONTROL; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

AUCTION; BUDGET BALANCE; COMBINATORIAL EXCHANGE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; SUPPLY CHAIN FORMATION;

PRODUCTION CONTROL;

EID: 9544248661     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.008     Document Type: Conference Paper

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