Auctions, evolution, and multi-agent learning

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4865 LNAI, Issue , 2008, Pages 188-210

  Phelps, Steve ^a   Cai, Kai ^b   McBurney, Peter ^a   Niu, Jinzhong ^b   Parsons, Simon ^a,b,c   Sklar, Elizabeth ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b City College of the City University of New York   (United States)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE AGENTS; AUCTION MECHANISMS; EUROPEAN; LEARNING AGENTS; MULTI-AGENT LEARNING;

ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS; AGENTS; COMMERCE; EDUCATION; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; LEARNING SYSTEMS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 49949100516     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77949-0_14     Document Type: Conference Paper

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