Achieving budget-balance with vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 1161-1168

  Parkes, David C ^a   Kalagnanam, Jayant ^b   Eso, Marta ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b IBM T J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY; BUYERS AND SELLERS; HARD CONSTRAINTS; MARKET-MAKER; PAYMENT SCHEMES; SIMPLE THRESHOLD SCHEME; STRATEGY PROOFS; STRATEGY-PROOFNESS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 84880863320     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (13)

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