Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 7-21

  Suyama, Takayuki ^a   Yokoo, Makoto ^b  

^a NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

^b KYUSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auction; Mechanism design; Multi attribute; Strategy false name proof

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-ATTRIBUTE; STRATEGY/FALSE-NAME PROOF;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SALES; STANDARDS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 21144442935     PISSN: 13872532     EISSN: 15737454     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-005-0983-2     Document Type: Article

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