Computational criticisms of the revelation principle

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 262-263

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Complexity; Mechanism Design; Revelation Principle

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; PROBLEM SOLVING; VECTORS;

REVELATION PRINCIPLE; SINGLE-STEP MECHANISMS; WORKSHOPS;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 3242745179     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988824     Document Type: Conference Paper

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