Computing equilibria: A computational complexity perspective

Economic Theory

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 193-236

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Equilibrium computation; NP completeness; PPAD completeness

Indexed keywords

EID: 75749149766     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0448-y     Document Type: Article

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