The computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concisely represented games

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 270-279

  Schoenebeck, Grant ^a   Vadhan, Salil ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Circuit games; Computational game theory; Concise games; Graph games; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

BOOLEAN ALGEBRA; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

CIRCUIT GAMES; CONCISE GAMES; GRAPH GAMES; NASH EQUILIBRIA;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33748687764     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134737     Document Type: Conference Paper

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