Graphical games

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 159-180

  Kearns, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC ASPECTS; COMPUTATIONAL PROPERTIES; GRAPH-THEORETIC MODELS; LARGE POPULATION; MULTIPLAYER GAMES; PARAMETRIC MODELS; PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE; STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS;

GRAPH THEORY;

EID: 84926111807     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.009     Document Type: Chapter

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