Finding equilibria in games of no chance

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4598 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 274-284

  Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt ^a   Miltersen, Peter Bro ^a   Sørensen, Troels Bjerre ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION ANALYSIS; LINEAR PROGRAMMING;

GAME TREE; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 37849000965     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_28     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (6)

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3. Koller, D., Megiddo, N.: The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form. Games and Economic Behavior 4, 528-552 (1992)
4. Koller, D., Megiddo, N., von Stengel, B.: Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees. In: Proceedings of the 26th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 750-759 (1994)
5. Kuhn, H.W.: Extensive games and the problem of information. Annals of Mathematical Studies 28, 193-216 (1953)
6. von Stengel, B., Forges, F.: Extensive form correlated equilibrium: Definition and computational complexity. Technical Report LSE-CDAM-2006-04, London School of Economics, Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics (2006)