Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: Definition and computational complexity

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1002-1022

  Von Stengel, Bernhard ^a   Forges, Françoise ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

Author keywords

Correlated equilibrium; Extensive game; Polynomial time computable

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM; EXTENSIVE GAME; INFORMATION SETS; POLYNOMIAL NUMBERS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME COMPUTABLE;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 58849128865     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: 15265471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1080.0340     Document Type: Article

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