Playing large games using simple strategies

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 36-41

  Lipton, Richard J ^a,b   Markakis, Evangelos ^a   Mehta, Aranyak ^a  

^a Georgia Institute of Technology   (United States)

^b TELCORDIA TECHNOLOGIES   (United States)

Author keywords

Nash equilibrium; Probabilistic method

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ECONOMICS; PROBABILITY;

LARGE GAMES; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0242624716     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779928.779933     Document Type: Conference Paper

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