Computing Nash equilibria: Approximation and smoothed complexity

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 603-612

  Chen, Xi ^a   Deng, Xiaotie ^b   Teng, Shang Hua ^c  

^a TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^c BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTATIONAL GEOMETRY; DATA STRUCTURES; PROBLEM SOLVING;

FIXED-POINT PROBLEM; GEOMETRIC LEMMA; NASH EQUILIBRIA; TWO-PLAYER GAME;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 36448991642     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2006.20     Document Type: Conference Paper

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