Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 21, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 40-55

  Foster, Dean P ^a   Vohra, Rakesh V ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031256578     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0595     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Aumann R. J. Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies. J. Math. Econ. 1:1974;67-96.
2. Aumann R. J. Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayes Rationality. Econometrica. 55:1987;1-18.
3. Blackwell D. A Vector Valued Analog of the Mini-Max Theorem. Pacific J. Math. 6:1956;1-8.
4. Brown G. W. Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play. Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. 1951;Wiley, New York.
5. Dawid A. P. The Well Calibrated Bayesian. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 77:1982;605-613.
6. D. P. Foster, R. Vohra, 1991, Asymptotic Calibration.
7. D. Fudenberg, D. Kreps, 1991, Experimentation, Learning, and Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games.
8. D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1995, An easier way to Calibrate.
9. D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1996, Conditional Universal Consistency.
10. S. Hart, A. Mas-Collel, 1996, A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium.
11. E. Kalai, E. Lehrer, 1994, Subjective Games and Equilibria.
12. E. Kalai, E. Lehrer, R. Smorodinsky, 1996, Calibrated Forecasting and Merging.
13. Kreps D. Game Theory and Economic Modeling. 1991a;Oxford University Press, Oxford.
14. D. Kreps, 1991b, Seminar on Learning in Games, University of Chicago.
15. Milgrom P., Roberts J. Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Normal Form Games. Games Econ. Behav. 3:1991;82-100.
16. D. Monderer, L. Shapley, 1993, Fictitous Play Property for Games with Identical Interests, Department of Economics, UCLA.
17. K. Miyasawa, 1961, On the Convergence of the Learning Process in a 2 × 2 Non-zero-Sum Two-Person Game, Economic Research Program, Princeton University.
18. Nau R. F., McCardle K. Coherent Behavior in Non-cooperative Games. J. Econ. Theory. 50:1990.
19. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 80:1985;339-339.
20. Robinson J. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Ann. of Math. 54:1951;296-301.
21. Samuelson L., Zhang J. Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games. J. Econ. Theory. 57:1992;363-391.
22. Shapley L. Some Topics in Two-Person Games. Advances in Game Theory. 1964.
23. Skyrms B. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. 1990;Harvard University Press, Cambridge.