Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game

Economic Theory

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 175-192

  Miltersen, Peter Bro ^a   Sørensen, Troels Bjerre ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Equilibrium computation; Quasi perfect equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 75749104688     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0440-6     Document Type: Article

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