Network formation games and the potential function method

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 487-516

  Tardos, ÉVa ^a   Wexler, Tom ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EFFICIENCY;

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS; DESIGN AND OPERATIONS; NETWORK FORMATION GAMES; POTENTIAL FUNCTION; PRINCIPLES OF INTERACTIONS; QUANTITATIVE STUDY; SERVICE PROVIDER;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84926076737     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.021     Document Type: Chapter

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