Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games

Journal of the ACM

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2008, Pages

  Papadimitriou, Christos H ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Complexity of equilibria; Correlated equilibria; Nash equilibria

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION-SPECIFIC; COMPLEXITY OF EQUILIBRIA; CONGESTION GAMES; CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA; CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM; ELLIPSOID ALGORITHM; LINEAR FUNCTIONS; MARKOV CHAINS; MULTI-PLAYER GAMES; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NP-HARD; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; PRODUCT DISTRIBUTIONS; STEADY-STATE COMPUTATIONS; TREE-WIDTH;

LINEAR PROGRAMMING; LINEARIZATION; MARKOV PROCESSES; NUCLEAR PROPULSION; OPTIMIZATION; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; POLYNOMIALS; TREES (MATHEMATICS); VECTORS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 48249144926     PISSN: 00045411     EISSN: 1557735X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1379759.1379762     Document Type: Article

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