A polynomial-time Nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games

Decision Support Systems

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 55-66

  Littman, Michael L ^a   Stone, Peter ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b University of Texas at Austin   (United States)

Author keywords

Complexity analysis; Computational game theory; Nash equilibrium; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; DECISION MAKING; DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS; GAME THEORY; POLYNOMIALS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS; COMPUTATIONAL GAME THEORY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; REPEATED GAMES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 9544234477     PISSN: 01679236     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.007     Document Type: Conference Paper

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