Chapter 30 A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO

Handbook of Industrial Organization

Volumn 3, Issue , 2007, Pages 1887-1966

  Doraszelski, Ulrich ^a   Pakes, Ariel ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Applications; Computational techniques; Dynamic oligopoly; Markov perfect equilibrium; Multiple equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049085988     PISSN: 1573448X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03030-5     Document Type: Review

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