The Interactive Effect of Monitoring and Incentive Alignment on Agency Costs

Journal of Management

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2019, Pages 701-727

  Martin, Geoffrey P ^a   Wiseman, Robert M ^b   Gomez Mejia, Luis R ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

agency theory; CEO decision making; executive compensation; incentive alignment

Indexed keywords

EID: 85058624521     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206316678453     Document Type: Article

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