CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

Journal of Finance

Volumn 70, Issue 5, 2015, Pages 2155-2184

  Jenter, Dirk ^a,b   Kanaan, Fadi ^c  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c Liberty Mutual Group   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84940851112     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12282     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Adams, Renée B., and Daniel Ferreira, 2007, A theory of friendly boards, Journal of Finance 62, 217-250.
2. Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Andrew A. Samwick, 1999a, Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence, Journal of Finance 54, 1999-2043.
3. Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Andrew A. Samwick, 1999b, The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation, Journal of Political Economy 107, 65-105.
4. Albuquerque, Ana, 2009, Peer firms in relative performance evaluation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 48, 69-89.
5. Antle, Rick, and Abbie J. Smith, 1986, An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives, Journal of Accounting Research 24, 1-39.
6. Barro, Jason R., and Robert J. Barro, 1990, Pay, performance, and turnover of bank CEOs, Journal of Labor Economics 8, 448-481.
7. Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried, 2004, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).
8. Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jesse M. Fried, and David I. Walker, 2001, Executive compensation in America: Optimal contracting or extraction of rents? Working Papers, Harvard University and the University of California at Berkeley.
9. Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001, Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principles are, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 901-932.
10. Core, John E., and Wayne R. Guay, 2001, When contracts require risk-averse executives to hold equity: Implications for option valuation and relative performance evaluation, Working paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
11. Core, John E., Wayne R. Guay, and David F. Larcker, 2003, Executive equity compensation and incentives: A survey, Economic Policy Review 9, 27-50.
12. Coughlan, Anne, and Ronald Schmidt, 1985, Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 43-66.
13. Cox, David R., 1972, Regression models and life tables (with discussion), Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 34, 187-220.
14. Diamond, Douglas W., and Robert E. Verrecchia, 1982, Optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices, Journal of Finance 37, 275-288.
15. Durell, Alan, 2001, Attribution in performance evaluation, Working paper, Dartmouth College.
16. Eisfeldt, Andrea L., and Camelia M. Kuhnen, 2013, CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework, Journal of Financial Economics 109, 351-372.
17. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1997, Industry costs of equity, Journal of Financial Economics 43, 153-193.
18. Fisman, Ray, Rakesh Khurana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, 2014, Governance and CEO turnover: Do something or do the right thing? Management Science 60, 319-337.
19. Frydman, Carola, and Dirk Jenter, 2010, CEO compensation, Annual Review of Financial Economics 2, 75-102.
20. Garen, John E., 1994, Executive compensation and principal-agent theory, Journal of Political Economy 102, 1175-1199.
21. Garvey, Gerald T., and Todd T. Milbourn, 2003, Incentive compensation when executives can hedge the market: Evidence of relative performance evaluation in the cross-section, Journal of Finance 58, 1557-1582.
22. Garvey, Gerald T., and Todd T. Milbourn, 2006, Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad, Journal of Financial Economics 82, 197-226.
23. Gibbons, Robert, and Kevin J. Murphy, 1990, Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, 30-51.
24. Hall, Brian J., and Kevin J. Murphy, 2003, The trouble with stock options, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 49-70.
25. Hermalin, Benjamin E., 2005, Trends in corporate governance, Journal of Finance 60, 2351-2384.
26. Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach, 1998, Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO, American Economic Review 88, 96-118.
27. Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach, 2003, Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature, Economic Policy Review 9, 7-26.
28. Himmelberg, Charles P., and R. Glenn Hubbard, 2000, Incentive pay and the market for CEOs: An analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity, Working paper, Columbia University.
29. Hirshleifer, David, and Anjan V. Thakor, 1994, Managerial performance, boards of directors and takeover bidding, Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 63-90.
30. Hirshleifer, David, and Anjan V. Thakor, 1998, Corporate control through board dismissals and takeovers, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 7, 489-520.
31. Holmström, Bengt, 1979, Moral hazard and observability, Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74-91.
32. Holmström, Bengt, 1982, Moral hazard in teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340.
33. Holmström, Bengt, and Steven N. Kaplan, 2001, Corporate governance and merger activity in the United States: Making sense of the 1980s and 1990s, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 121-144.
34. Huson, Mark R., Robert Parrino, and Laura T. Starks, 2001, Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A long-term perspective, Journal of Finance 56, 2265-2297.
35. Janakiraman, Surya N., Richard A. Lambert, and David F. Larker, 1992, An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis, Journal of Accounting Research 30, 53-69.
36. Jenter, Dirk, 2002, Executive compensation, incentives, and risk, Working paper, MIT Sloan School of Management.
37. Jenter, Dirk, and Fadi Kanaan, 2008, CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation, Working paper, Stanford University.
38. Jin, Li, 2002, CEO compensation, diversification and incentives, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 29-63.
39. Kaplan, Steven N., 2008, Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? Academy of Management Perspectives 22, 5-20.
40. Kaplan, Steven N., and Bernadette A. Minton, 2012, How has CEO turnover changed? Increasingly performance sensitive boards and increasingly uneasy CEOs, International Review of Finance 12, 57-87.
41. Lunn, Mary, and Don McNeil, 1995, Applying Cox regressions to competing risks, Biometrics 51, 524-532.
42. Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1989, Alternative mechanisms for corporate control, American Economic Review 79, 842-852.
43. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985, Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 11-42.
44. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999, Executive compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds.: Handbook of Labor Economics (Elsevier Science, North Holland, Amsterdam).
45. Oyer, Paul, 2004, Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects? Journal of Finance 59, 1619-1649.
46. Parrino, Robert, 1997, CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197.
47. Shea, John, 1998, Nominal illusion: Evidence from major league baseball, Working paper, University of Maryland.
48. Taylor, Lucian A., 2010, Why are CEOs rarely fired? Evidence from structural estimation, Journal of Finance 65, 2051-2087.
49. Warner, Jerold B., Ross L. Watts, and Karen H. Wruck, 1988, Stock prices and top management changes, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 461-492.
50. Warther, Vincent A., 1998, Board effectiveness and board dissent: A model of the board's relationship to management and shareholders, Journal of Corporate Finance 4, 53-70.
51. Weber, Roberto, Colin Camerer, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Marc Knez, 2001, The illusion of leadership: Misattribution of cause in coordination games, Organization Science 12, 582-598.
52. Wolfers, Justin, 2002, Are voters rational? Evidence from gubernatorial elections, Working paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business.