Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 451-472

  Martin, Geoffrey P ^a   Gomez Mejia, Luis R ^b   Wiseman, Robert M ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879661698     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2010.0967     Document Type: Article

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