Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 106, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 513-526

  Laux, Volker ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO turnover; Executive pay; Managerial myopia; Stock option vesting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867851582     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.06.003     Document Type: Article

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