Varieties of externalism

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 63-109

  Carter, J Adam ^a   Kallestrup, Jesper ^a   Palermos, S Orestis ^a   Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927585816     PISSN: 15336077     EISSN: 17582237     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/phis.12026     Document Type: Article

References (141)

1. Adams, F., &, Aizawa, K,. (2008). The Bounds of Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell.
2. Adler, J., (2002). Belief's Own Ethics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3. Alston, W. P., (1986). ' The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification ', Philosophical Perspectives 2, 257-99.
4. Bach, K., (1985). ' A Rationale for Reliabilism ', Monist 68, 246-63.
5. Bach-y-Rita, P., &, Kercel, S. W,. (2003). ' Sensory Substitution and the Human-Machine Interface ', Trends in Cognitive Science 7, 541-46.
6. Becker, K., (2007). Epistemology Modalized, London: Routledge.
7. Becker, K., (2010). ' Modal Epistemology ', Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy, DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0139.
8. Bergmann, (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Black, T., (2002). ' A Moorean Response to Brain-in-a-Vat Scepticism ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, 148-63.
10. Black, T., (2008). ' Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism ', New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.), V. F. Hendricks, &, D. H. Pritchard, 8-27, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
11. Black, T., &, Murphy, P,. (2007). ' In Defense of Sensitivity ', Synthese 154, 53-71.
12. Block, N., (1990). ' Inverted Earth ', Philosophical Perspectives 4, 53-79.
13. Boghossian, P., (1989). ' Content and Self-Knowledge ', Philosophical Topics 17, 5-26.
14. Boghossian, P., (1992). ' Externalism and Inference ', Philosophical Issues 2, 11-28.
15. BonJour, L., (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16. BonJour, L., (1992). ' Externalism/Internalism ', A Companion to Epistemology, (eds.), J. Dancy, &, E. Sosa, 132-36, Oxford: Blackwell.
17. BonJour, L., (2002). ' Internalism and Externalism ', Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, (ed.), P. Moser, 234-64, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18. Bonjour, L., &, Sosa, E,. (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Oxford: Blackwell.
19. Brooks, R., (1991a). ' Intelligence without Representation ', Artificial Intelligence 47, 139-59.
20. Brooks, R., (1991b). ' Intelligence without Reason ', Proceedings of 12th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 569-95.
21. Brueckner, A., (2002). ' The Consistency of Content-Externalism and Justification-Internalism ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, 512-25.
22. Burge, T., (1986). ' Individualism and Psychology ', Philosophical Review 95, 3-45.
23. Carter, J. A., (Forthcoming). ' Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck ' Synthese.
24. Chase, J., (2001). ' Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification? ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79, 227-46.
25. Chemero, A., (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
26. nd ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
27. Clark, A., (1997). Being There: Putting Mind, Body, and World Together Again, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
28. Clark, A., (2007). ' Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of the Extended Mind ', Journal of Philosophy 104, 163-92.
29. Clark, A., (2008). Supersizing The Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
30. Clark, A., (2009). ' Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head ', Mind 118, 963-93.
31. Clark, A., (2010). ' Memento's Revenge: The Extended Mind, Extended ', Extended Mind, (ed.), R. Menary, 43-66, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
32. Clark, A., &, Chalmers, D,. (1998). ' The Extended Mind ', Analysis 58, 7-19.
33. Cohen, S., (1984). ' Justification and Truth ', Philosophical Studies 46, 279-96.
34. Conee, E., &, Feldman, R., (2004). Evidentialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
35. Conee, E., &, Feldman, R., (2011). ' Reply to Pritchard ', Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.), T. Dougherty, 440-44, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
36. Dougherty, T., (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
37. Dretske, F., (1970). ' Epistemic Operators ', Journal of Philosophy 67, 1007-23.
38. Dretske, F., (1971). ' Conclusive Reasons ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49, 1-22.
39. Dretske, F., (1996). ' Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia? ', Philosophical Issues 7, 143-58.
40. Engel, M., (1992). ' Personal and Doxastic Justification ', Philosophical Studies 67, 133-51.
41. Feldman, R., (2005). ' Respecting the Evidence ', Philosophical Perspectives 19, 95-119.
42. Froese, T., Gershenson, C., &, Rosenblueth, D. A,. (2013). ' The Dynamically Extended Mind ', available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.1958.
43. Fuller, S., (2012). ' Social Epistemology: A Quarter-Century Itinerary ', Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy 26, 267-83.
44. Gallagher, S., (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
45. Giere, R., &, Moffat, B,. (2003). ' Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge ', Social Studies of Science 33, 1-10.
46. Goldman, A., (1976). ' Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge ', Journal of Philosophy 73, 771-91.
47. Goldman, A., (1979). ' What Is Justified Belief? ', Justification and Knowledge, (ed.), G. Pappas, 1-23, Dordrecht: Reidel.
48. Goldman, A., (1986). Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
49. Goldman, A., (1988). ' Strong and Weak Justification ', Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, (ed.), J. Tomberlin, 51-69, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
50. Greco, J., (1999). ' Agent Reliabilism ', Philosophical Perspectives 13, 273-96.
51. Greco, J., (2004). ' Knowledge As Credit For True Belief ', Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, (eds.), M. DePaul, &, L. Zagzebski, 111-34, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
52. Greco, J., (2007). ' The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge ', Philosophical Issues 17, 57-69.
53. Greco, J., (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
54. Haddock, A., Millar, A., &, Pritchard, D. H., (eds) (2010). Social Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
55. Hawthorne, J., &, Stanley, J,. (2008). ' Knowledge and Action ', Journal of Philosophy 105, 571-90.
56. Heylighen, F., Heath, M., &, Van Overwalle, F,. (2007). ' The Emergence of Distributed Cognition: A Conceptual Framework', Proceedings of Collective Intentionality IV, Siena, Italy: University of Siena.
57. Hutchins, E., (1995). Cognition in the Wild, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
58. Kallestrup, J., (2011). Semantic Externalism, London: Routledge.
59. Kallestrup, J., &, Pritchard, D. H,. (2004). ' An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism ', Philosophia 31, 345-54.
60. Kallestrup, J., (2011). ' Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth ', European Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00495.x.
61. Kallestrup, J., (2012). ' Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism ', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93, 84-103.
62. Kallestrup, J., (2013). ' Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence ', Knowledge, Virtue and Action, (eds.), T. Henning, &, D. Schweikard, London: Routledge.
63. Kallestrup, J., &, Sprevak, M,. (Forthcoming). ' Entangling Externalisms ', New Waves in Philosophy of Mind, (eds.), J. Kallestrup, &, M. Sprevak, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
64. Kiverstein, J., &, Farina, M,. (2012). ' Do Sensory Substitution Devices Extend the Conscious Mind? ', Consciousness in Interaction: The Role of the Natural and Social Context in Shaping Consciousness, (ed.), F. Paglieri, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
65. Latour, B., (1986). ' Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands ', Knowledge and Society 6, 1-40.
66. Lehrer, K., &, Cohen, S,. (1983). ' Justification, Truth, and Coherence ', Synthese 55, 191-207.
67. Littlejohn, C., (2009). ' The New Evil Demon Problem ', Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (eds.), B. Dowden, &, J. Fieser, www.iep.utm.edu/evil-new/.
68. Littlejohn, C., (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
69. Luper, S., (1984). ' The Epistemic Predicament ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62, 26-50.
70. Littlejohn, C., (2003). ' Indiscernability Skepticism ', The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, (ed.), S. Luper, 183-202, Aldershot: Ashgate.
71. Lycan, (2001). ' The Case for Phenomenal Externalism ', Noûs 35, 17-35.
72. Madison, B. J. C., (2009). ' On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism ', Acta Analytica 24, 173-183.
73. Madison, B. J. C., (2010). ' Epistemic Internalism ', Philosophy Compass 5, 840-853.
74. Madison, B. J. C., (Forthcoming). ' Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon ', Acta Analytica.
75. Menary, R., (2006). ' Attacking the Bounds of Cognition ', Philosophical Psychology 19, 329-44.
76. Menary, R., (2007). Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbound, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
77. McKinsey, M., (1991). ' Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access ', Analysis 51, 9-16.
78. Neta, R., &, Pritchard, D. H,. (2007). ' McDowell and the New Evil Genius ', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 381-96.
79. Nöe, A., (2003). ' Causation and Perception: The Puzzle Unravelled ', Analysis 63, 93-100.
80. Nöe, A., (2004). Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
81. Nozick, R., (1981). Philosophical Explanations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
82. Olsson (2012). ' Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification ', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.), E. N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/justep-coherence.
83. Palermos, O., (2011). ' Belief-Forming Processes, Extended ', Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2, 741-65.
84. Palermos, O., (2014). ' Loops, Constitution, and Cognitive Extension ', Cognitive Systems Research, 27: 25-41.
85. Palermos, O., (Forthcominga). ' Could Reliability Naturally Imply Safety? ', European Journal of Philosophy, DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12046.
86. Palermos, O., (Forthcomingb). ' Knowledge and Cognitive Integration ', Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0383-02.
87. Palermos, Orestis, &, Duncan Pritchard,. 2013. ' Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology ', Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 105-120.
88. Pappas, G., (2005). ' Internalist versus Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification ', Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (ed.), E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/.
89. Plantinga, A., (1993). Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press.
90. Poston, T., (2008). ' Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology ', Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (eds.), B. Dowden, &, J. Fieser, www.iep.utm.edu/int-ext/.
91. Pritchard, D. H., (2002a). ' McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments ', Synthese 130, 279-302.
92. Pritchard, D. H., (2002b). ' Recent Work on Radical Skepticism ', American Philosophical Quarterly 39, 215-57.
93. Pritchard, D. H., (2002c). ' Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic ', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 283-307.
94. Pritchard, D. H., (2005a). Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
95. Pritchard, D. H., (2005b). ' Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, 185-206.
96. Pritchard, D. H., (2007a). ' Anti-Luck Epistemology ', Synthese 158, 277-97.
97. Pritchard, D. H., (2007b). ' How to be a Neo-Moorean ', Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, (ed.), S. Goldberg, 68-99, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
98. Pritchard, D. H., (2008a). ' McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism ', Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, (eds.), A. Haddock, &, F. Macpherson, 283-310, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
99. Pritchard, D. H., (2008b). ' Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology ', Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, (ed.), J. Greco, 437-55, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
100. Pritchard, D. H., (2009a). ' Apt Performance and Epistemic Value ', Philosophical Studies 143, 407-16.
101. Pritchard, D. H., (2009b). Knowledge, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
102. Pritchard, D. H., (2009c). ' Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value ', Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.), A. O'Hear, 19-43, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
103. Pritchard, D. H., (2009d). ' Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now? ', Journal of Philosophical Research 34, 33-45.
104. Pritchard, D. H., (2010a). ' Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis ', Synthese 175, 133-51.
105. Pritchard, D. H., (2010b). ' Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination ', Noûs 44, 245-68.
106. Pritchard, D. H., (2011). ' Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism ', Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.), T. Dougherty, 362-92.
107. Pritchard, D. H., (2012a). ' Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology ', Journal of Philosophy 109, 247-79.
108. Pritchard, D. H., (2012b). Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
109. Pritchard, D. H., (2012c). ' In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology ', The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, (eds.), T. Black, &, K. Becker, 173-92, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
110. nd Ed.), (eds.), M. Steup, J. Turri, &, E. Sosa, §7, Oxford: Blackwell.
111. Pritchard, D. H., (Forthcoming). ' The Modal Account of Luck ', Metaphilosophy.
112. Pritchard, D. H., Millar, A., &, Haddock, A,. (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
113. Pritchard, D. H., &, Smith, M,. (2004). ' The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck ', New Ideas in Psychology 22, 1-28.
114. Pryor, J., (2001). ' Highlights of Recent Epistemology ', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52, 95-124.
115. Putnam, H., (1975). ' The Meaning of "Meaning "', Language, Mind and Knowledge, (ed.), K. Gunderson, 131-93, Minneapolis, IND: University of Minnesota Press.
116. Roush, S., (2005). Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence and Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
117. Rupert, D. R., (2004). ' Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition ', Journal of Philosophy 101, 389-428.
118. Rupert, D. R., (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
119. Sainsbury, R. M., (1997). ' Easy Possibilities ', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 907-19.
120. Sosa, E., (1988). ' Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge ', Mind 97, 153-88.
121. Sosa, E., (1991). Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
122. Sosa, E., (1999). ' How to Defeat Opposition to Moore ', Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141-54.
123. Sosa, E., (2007). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
124. Sosa, E., (2009). Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
125. rd Ed.), (ed.), L. Pojman, 310-21, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
126. Sutton, J., Barnier, A., Harris, C., &, Wilson, R,. (2008). ' A Conceptual and Empirical Framework for the Social Distribution of Cognition: The Case of Memory ', Cognitive Systems Research, 1-2, 33-51.
127. Theiner, G., (2011). Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis, Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang GmbH, Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften.
128. Theiner, G., Allen, C., &, Goldstone, R,. (2010). ' Recognizing Group Cognition ', Cognitive Systems Research 11, 378-95.
129. Tollefsen, D., &, Dale, R,. (2011). ' Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach ', Philosophical Psychology 25, 385-407.
130. Turri, J., (2011). ' Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved ', Philosophers' Imprint 11, available at: http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0011.008.
131. Vahid, H., (2003). ' Content Externalism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate in Justification Theory ', European Journal of Philosophy 11, 89-107.
132. Varela, F., Thompson, E., &, Rosch, E,. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
133. Vogel, J., (2000). ' Reliabilism Leveled ', Journal of Philosophy 97, 602-23.
134. Vogel, J., (2007). ' Subjunctivitis ', Philosophical Studies 134, 73-88.
135. Wegner, M., Giuliano, T., &, Hertel, P,. (1985). ' Cognitive Interdependence in Close Relationships ', Compatible and Incompatible Relationships, (ed.), W. J. Ickes, 253-76, New York: Springer-Verlag.
136. Wheeler, M., (2005). Reconstructing the Cognitive World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
137. Williams, M., (1991). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, Oxford: Blackwell.
138. Williamson, T., (2000). Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
139. Williamson, T., (2007). ' On Being Justified in One's Head ', Rationality and the Good, (eds.), M. Timmons, J. Greco, &, A. Mele, 106-122, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
140. Wilson, R. A., (2000). ' The Mind Beyond Itself ', Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, (ed.), D. Sperber, 31-52, New York: Oxford: University Press.
141. Wilson, R. A., (2004). Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition, New York: Cambridge University Press.