Highlights of recent epistemology

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 95-124

  Pryor, James ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040675480     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/52.1.95     Document Type: Review

References (149)

1. Alston, W. [1989]: Epistemic Justification, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
2. Alston, W. [1993]: 'Epistemic Desiderata', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, pp. 527-51.
3. Annis, D. [1978]: 'A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification', American Philosophical Quarterly, 15, pp. 213-19.
4. Audi, R. [1993]: The Structure of Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Axtell, G. [1997]: 'Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology', American Philosophical Quarterly, 34, pp. 1-26.
6. Bealer, G. [1987]: 'Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 1, pp. 289-365.
7. Bealer, G. [1999]: 'The A Priori', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Maiden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 243-70.
8. Bennett, J. [1990]: 'Why Is Belief Involuntary?' Analysis, 50, pp. 87-107.
9. Boghossian, P. and Peacocke, C. [2001]: New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10. Bonjour, L. [1978]: 'Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?', American Philosophical Quarterly, 15, pp. 1-13.
11. Bonjour, L. [1985]: The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
12. Bonjour, L. [1994]: 'Against Naturalized Epistemology', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19, pp. 283-300.
13. Bonjour, L. [1998]: In Defense of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Bonjour, L. [1999a]: 'The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Maiden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 117-42.
15. Bonjour, L. [1999b]: 'Foundationalism and the External World', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp. 229-50.
16. Burge, T. [1993]: 'Content Preservation', Philosophical Review, 102, pp. 457-88.
17. Burge, T. [1996]: 'Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, pp. 91-116.
18. Casullo, A. [1988]: 'Revisability, Reliabilism and A Priori Knowledge', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49, pp. 187-213.
19. Casullo, A. [1999]: A Priori Knowledge, Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth.
20. Chisholm, R. M. [1977]: Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edn, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
21. Chisholm, R. M. [1982]: 'A Version of Foundationalism', in Foundations of Knowing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3-32.
22. Cohen, S. [1984]: 'Justification and Truth', Philosophical Studies, 46, pp. 279-95.
23. Cohen, S. [1987]: 'Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards', Synthese, 73, pp. 3-26.
24. Cohen, S. [1988]: 'How to Be a Fallibilist', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp. 91-123.
25. Cohen, S. [1991]: 'Skepticism, Relevance, and Relativity', in B. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp. 17-37.
26. Cohen, S. [1995]: 'Is There an Issue About Justified Belief?', Philosophical Topics, 23, pp. 113-27.
27. Cohen, S. [1998]: 'Fumerton on Metaepistemology and Skepticism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58, pp. 913-8.
28. Cohen, S. [1999]: 'Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp. 57-90.
29. Conee, E. [1988]: 'The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification', Monist, 71, pp. 389-404.
30. Cook, J. T. [1987]: 'Deciding to Believe without Self-Deception', Journal of Philosophy, 84, pp. 441-46.
31. Davidson, D. [1981]: 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', in E. LePore (ed.) [1986], Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 307-19.
32. Davies, M. [1998]: 'Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant', in C. Wright, M. Smith and C. Macdonald (eds), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 321-61.
33. Davies, M. [2001]: 'Externalism and Armchair Knowledge', in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds). New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
34. DeRose, K. [1992]: 'Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, pp. 913-29.
35. DeRose, K. [1995]: 'Solving the Skeptical Problem', Philosophical Review, 104, pp. 1-52.
36. DeRose, K. [1999]: 'Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Maiden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 187-205.
37. DeRose, K. [2000]: 'Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, pp. 697-706.
38. Dretske, F. [1970]: 'Epistemic Operators', Journal of Philosophy, 67, pp. 1007-23.
39. Dretske, F. [1981]: 'The Pragmatic Dimensions of Knowledge', Philosophical Studies, 40, pp. 363-78.
40. Dretske, F. [1991]: 'Dretske's Replies', in B. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
41. Edidin, A. [1984]: 'A Priori Knowledge for Fallibilists', Philosophical Studies, 46, pp. 189-97.
42. Fales, E. [1996]: A Defense of the Given, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
43. Feldman, R. [1988]: 'Epistemic Obligations', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp. 235-56.
44. Feldman, R. [1999a]: 'Contextualism and Skepticism', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp. 91-114.
45. Feldman, R. [1999b]: 'Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 170-86.
46. Feldman, R. [2000]: 'The Ethics of Belief', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, pp. 667-96.
47. Feldman, R. [2001]: 'Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation', in M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
48. Feldman, R. and Conee, E. [1985]: 'Evidentialism', Philosophical Studies, 48, pp. 15-34.
49. Feldman, R. and Conee E. [forthcoming]: 'Internalism Defended', in H. Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, URL: 〈http:// www.ling.rochester.edu/~feldman/papers.html〉.
50. Foley, R. [1987]: The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
51. Foley, R. [1994]: 'Quine and Naturalized Epistemology', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19, pp. 243-60.
52. Forbes, G. [1984]: 'Nozick on Skepticism', Philosophical Quarterly, 34, pp. 43-52.
53. Fuller, S. [1996]: 'Recent Work on Social Epistemology', American Philosophical Quarterly, 33, pp. 149-66.
54. Fumerton, R. [1985]: Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception, Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.
55. Fumerton, R. [1988]: 'The Internalism/Externalism Controversy', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp. 443-59.
56. Fumerton, R. [1995]: Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
57. Giere, R. [1988]: Explaining Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
58. Ginet, C. [1975]: Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, Dordrecht: Reidel.
59. Goggans, P. [1991]: 'Epistemic Obligations and Doxastic Voluntarism', Analysis, 51, pp. 102-5.
60. Goldman, A. [1976]: 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy, 73, pp. 771-91.
61. Goldman, A. [1978]: 'Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition', Journal of Philosophy, 75, pp. 509-23.
62. Goldman, A. [1979]: 'What Is Justified Belief?' in G. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1-23.
63. Goldman, A. [1980]: 'The Internalist Conception of Justification', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, pp. 27-51.
64. Goldman, A. [1986]: Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
65. Goldman, A. [1988]: 'Strong and Weak Justification', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp. 51-69.
66. Goldman, A. [1991]: 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology', in Liaisons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 155-75.
67. Goldman, A. [1994]: 'Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19, pp. 301-20.
68. Goldman, A. [1999]: 'Internalism Exposed', Journal of Philosophy, 96, pp. 271-93.
69. Greco, J. [1990]: 'Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief', Synthese, 85, pp. 245-77.
70. Greco, J. [1993]: 'Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23, pp. 413-32.
71. Greco, J. [1999]: 'Virtue Epistemology', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL: 〈http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/〉.
72. Haack, S. [1993]: Evidence and Inquiry, Oxford: Blackwell.
73. Haack, S. [1997]: '"The Ethics of Belief" Reconsidered', in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 129-44.
74. Hall, R. J. and Johnson, C. R. [1998]: 'The Epistemic Duty to Seek More Evidence', American Philosophical Quarterly, 35, pp. 129-39.
75. Harman, G. [1968]: 'Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation', American Philosophical Quarterly, 5, pp. 164-73.
76. Harman, G. [1973]: Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
77. Harman, G. [1980]: 'Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, pp. 163-82.
78. Heil, J. [1983a]: 'Believing What One Ought', Journal of Philosophy, 80, pp. 752-65.
79. Heil, J. [1983b]: 'Doxastic Agency', Philosophical Studies, 43, pp. 355-64.
80. Heil, J. [1984]: 'Doxastic Incontinence', Mind, 93, pp. 56-70.
81. Heil, J. [1992]: 'Believing Reasonably', Noûs, 26, pp. 47-62.
82. Heller, M. [1989]: 'Relevant Alternatives', Philosophical Studies, 55, pp. 23-40.
83. Heller, M. [1999a]: 'The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp. 115-30.
84. Heller, M. [1999b]: 'Relevant Alternatives and Closure', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, pp. 196-208.
85. Jacobson, S. [1997]: 'Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms', Synthese, 110, pp. 381-97.
86. Kelly, T. [2000]: 'The Ethics of Belief', Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University.
87. Kim, J. [1988]: 'What Is "Naturalized Epistemology"?' in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp. 381-405.
88. Kim, K. [1993]: 'Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology', American Philosophical Quarterly, 30, pp. 303-16.
89. Kitcher, P. [1992]: 'The Naturalists Return', Philosophical Review, 101, pp. 53-114.
90. Korcz, K. A. [1997]: 'Recent Work on the Basing Relation', American Philosophical Quarterly, 34, pp. 171-89.
91. Kornblith, H. [1982]: 'The Psychological Turn', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60, pp. 238-53.
92. Kornblith, H. [1983]: 'Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action', Philosophical Review, 92, pp. 33-48.
93. Kornblith, H. [1993]: 'Epistemic Normativity', Synthese, 94, pp. 357-76.
94. Kornblith, H. [1995]: 'Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics', Philosophical Topics, 23, pp. 237-55.
95. Kornblith, H. [1999]: 'In Defense of a Naturalized Epistemology', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Maiden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 158-69.
96. Laudan, L. [1987]: 'Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24, pp. 19-31.
97. Laudan, L. [1996]: Beyond Positivism and Relativism, Boulder, CO: Westview.
98. Lewis, D. [1996]: 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp. 549-67.
99. Ludlow, P. and N. Martin. [1998]: Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Stanford: CSLI Publications.
100. Luper-Foy, S. [1987]: The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
101. McGinn, C. [1984]: 'The Concept of Knowledge', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9, pp. 529-54.
102. McGrew, T. [1995]: The Foundations of Knowledge, Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adams.
103. Maffie, J. [1990a]: 'Naturalism and the Normativity of Epistemology', Philosophical Studies, 59, pp. 333-49.
104. Maffie, J. [1990b]: 'Recent Work on Naturalized Epistemology', American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, pp. 281-93.
105. Meiland, J. [1980]: 'What Ought We to Believe? The Ethics of Belief Reconsidered', American Philosophical Quarterly, 17, pp. 15-24.
106. Montmarquet, J. [1993]: Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
107. Moser, P.K. [1985]: Empirical Justification, Dordrecht: Reidel.
108. Moser, P.K. [1987]: A Priori Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
109. Moser, P.K. [1989]: Knowledge and Evidence, New York: Cambridge University Press.
110. Naylor, M.B. [1985]: 'Voluntary Belief', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 45, pp. 427-36.
111. Nozick, R. [1981]: Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
112. Nozick, R. [1993]: The Nature of Rationality, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
113. Plantinga, A. [1988]: 'Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp. 1-50.
114. Plantinga, A. [1993a]: Warrant: The Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press.
115. Plantinga, A. [1993b]: Warrant and Proper Function, New York: Oxford University Press.
116. Pollock, J. [1983]: 'Epistemology and Probability', Synthese, 55, pp. 231-52.
117. Pollock, J. and Cruz, J. [1999]: Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd edn, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
118. Pryor, J. [2000]: 'The Skeptic and the Dogmatist', Noûs, 34, pp. 517-49.
119. Quine, W. V. O. [1969]: 'Epistemology Naturalized', in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 69-90.
120. Radcliffe, D. [1997]: 'Scott-Kakures on Believing at Will', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, pp. 145-51.
121. Riggs, W. D. [1997]: The Weakness of Strong Justification', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75, pp. 179-89.
122. Schiffer, S. [1996]: 'Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, pp. 317-33.
123. Schmitt, F. [1999]: 'Social Epistemology', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 354-82.
124. Scott-Kakures, D. [1994]: 'On Belief and Captivity of the Will', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, pp. 77-103.
125. Sellars, W. [1956]: 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, pp. 253-329.
126. Sosa, E. [1991]: Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
127. Steup, M. [1988]: 'The Deontic Conception of Epistemic Justification', Philosophical Studies, 53, pp. 65-84.
128. Steup, M. [1999]: 'A Defense of Internalism', in L. Pojman (ed.), Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 373-84.
129. Steup, M. [2001]: Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
130. Stich, S. [1990]: The Fragmentation of Reason, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
131. Stine, G. C. [1976]: 'Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure', Philosophical Studies, 29, pp. 249-61.
132. Swain, M. [1981]: Reasons and Knowledge, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
133. Swain, M. [1985]: 'Justification, Reasons and Reliability', Synthese, 64, pp. 69-92.
134. Triplett, T. [1990]: 'Recent Work on Foundationalism', American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, pp. 93-116.
135. Unger, P. [1986]: 'The Cone Model of Knowledge', Philosophical Topics, 14, pp. 125-78.
136. Vogel, J. [1990]: 'Are There Counter-Examples to the Closure Principle?' in M. D. Roth and G. Ross (eds), Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 13-27.
137. Vogel, J. [1999]: 'The New Relevant Alternatives Theory', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp. 155-80.
138. Williams, B. [1970]: 'Deciding to Believe', in B. Williams [1973], Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-51.
139. Williams, M. [1996]: Unnatural Doubts, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
140. Williams, M. [1999a]: Groundless Belief, 2nd edn, Oxford: Blackwell.
141. Williams, M. [1999b]: 'Skepticism', in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 35-69.
142. Williamson, T. [1995]: 'Is Knowing a State of Mind?', Mind, 104, pp. 533-65.
143. Williamson, T. [1997]: 'Knowledge as Evidence', Mind, 106, pp. 717-41.
144. Winters, B. [1979]: 'Believing at Will', Journal of Philosophy, 76, pp. 243-56.
145. Wolterstorff, N. [1997]: 'Obligations of Belief: Two Concepts', in L. E. Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick Chisholm, La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 217-38.
146. Wright, C. [1985]: 'Facts and Certainty', Proceedings of the British Academy, 71, pp. 429-72.
147. Wright, C. [1991]: 'Skepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon', Mind, 100, pp. 87-115.
148. Wright, C. [2000]: 'Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof', in E. Villanuova (ed.), Philosophical Issues, 10.
149. Wright, C., Smith, M., and Macdonald, C. [1998]: Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.