Subjunctivitis

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 134, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 73-88

  Vogel, Jonathan ^a  

^a AMHERST COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Closure principle; Contextualism; De Rose; Induction; Knowledge; Misleading evidence; Nozick; Reliablism; Safety; Sensitivity; Sosa; Tracking

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947648340     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-006-9013-8     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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2. De Rose, K. (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. The Philosophical Review, 104, 1-52.
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4. Dretske, F. (1971). Conclusive reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 1-22.
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6. Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. S. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 1-23). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
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11. Sosa, E. (1999). How must knowledge be modally related to what is known? Philosophical Topics, 26, 373-384.
12. Sosa, E. (2002). Tracking, competence, and knowledge. In P. Moser (Ed.), Oxford handbook of epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
13. Vogel, J. (2000). Reliabilism leveled. Journal of Philosophy, 97, 602-623.
14. Vogel, J. (1987). Tracking, closure, and inductive knowledge. In S. Luper-Foy (Ed.), The possibility of knowledge. Totowa: N.J. Rowman and Littlefield.
15. Wittgenstein, L. (1972). On certainty. New York: Harper and Row.