Knowledge and cognitive integration

Synthese

Volumn 191, Issue 8, 2014, Pages 1931-1951

  Palermos, Spyridon Orestis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cognitive character; Cognitive integration; Epistemic group agency; Extended cognition; Knowledge; Subjective justification; Virtue reliabilism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84897570778     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0383-0     Document Type: Article

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