Virtue epistemology and epistemic twin earth

European Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 335-357

  Kallestrup, Jesper ^a   Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84907951823     PISSN: 09668373     EISSN: 14680378     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00495.x     Document Type: Article

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