Anti-luck epistemology

Synthese

Volumn 158, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 277-297

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Epistemic internalism externalism; Epistemology; Luck; Safety; Scepticism; Virtue epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748862954     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Axtell G. (2003). Felix Culpa: luck in ethics and epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34:331-352
2. Axtell, G. (2007). Felix Culpa revisited: two for the show. Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9045-9 (this issue).
3. Becker, K. (forthcoming). Reliabilism and safety. Metaphilosophy.
4. Code L. (1987). Epistemic responsibility. University Press of New England, Hanover, New Hampshire
5. Cohen S. (2000). Contextualism and skepticism. Philosophical Issues 10:94-107
6. Coffman, E. J. (2007). Thinking about luck. SyntheseDOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9046-8 (this issue).
7. Dancy J. (1985). Introduction to contemporary epistemology. Blackwell, Oxford
8. DeRose K. (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. Philosophical Review 104:1-52
9. Dretske F. (1970). Epistemic operators. The Journal of Philosophy 67:1007-1023
10. Fumerton R. (1995). Metaepistemology and skepticism. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland
11. Goldberg. S. (2007). How lucky can you get? Synthese DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9042-z (this issue).
12. Greco J. (1999). Agent reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13:273-396
13. Greco J. (2003). Virtue and luck, epistemic and otherwise. Metaphilosophy 34:353-366
14. Greco, J. (2007). Worries about Pritchard's safety. Synthese DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9040-1 (this issue).
15. Harman G. (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton
16. Hawthorne J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Clarendon Press, Oxford
17. Hiller, A., & Neta, R. (2007). Safety and epistemic luck. Synthese DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0 (this issue).
18. Lackey, J. (2005). What luck is not. manuscript.
19. Lewis D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:549-567
20. McDowell J. (1995). Knowledge and the internal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:877-893
21. Nagel T. (1976). Moral luck. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76:136-150
22. Neta, R., & Pritchard, D. H. (forthcoming). McDowell and the new evil genius. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
23. Nozick R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Oxford University Press, Oxford
24. Plantinga A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. Oxford University Press, New York
25. Pritchard D.H. (2002a). Recent work on radical skepticism. American Philosophical Quarterly 39:215-257
26. Pritchard D.H. (2002b). Resurrecting the moorean response to the sceptic. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10:283-307
27. Pritchard D.H. (2003a). McDowell on reasons, externalism and scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11:273-294
28. Pritchard D.H. (2003b). Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck. Metaphilosophy 34:106-130
29. Pritchard D.H. (2004). The epistemology of testimony. Philosophical Issues 14:326-348
30. Pritchard D.H. (2005a). Epistemic luck. Oxford University Press, Oxford
31. Pritchard D.H. (2005b). Scepticism, epistemic luck and epistemic. Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83:185-206
32. Pritchard D.H. (2005c). The structure of sceptical arguments. The Philosophical Quarterly 55:37-52
33. Pritchard D.H. (2006a). How to be a neo-Moorean. In: Goldberg S. (eds) Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
34. Pritchard D.H. (2006b). Knowledge, luck, and lotteries. In: Hendricks V.F., Pritchard D.H. (eds) New waves in epistemology. Ashgate, Aldershot
35. Pritchard D.H. (2006c). McDowellian neo-Mooreanism. In: Haddock A., Macpherson F. (eds) New essays on disjunctivism. Oxford University Press, Oxford
36. Pritchard D.H., Smith M. (2004). The psychology and philosophy of luck. New Ideas in Psychology 22:1-28
37. Riggs, W. (2007). Why epistemologists are so down on their luck. Synthese DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9043-y (this issue).
38. Sainsbury R.M. (1997). Easy possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57:907-919
39. Schaffer J. (2005). Contrastive knowledge. In: Gendler T., Hawthorne J. (eds) Oxford studies in epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford
40. Sosa, E. (1991). Intellectual virtue in perspective. In Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
41. Sosa E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to moore. Philosophical Perspectives 13:141-154
42. Sosa E. (2000). Skepticism and contextualism. Philosophical Issues 10:1-18
43. Stroud B. (1984). The significance of philosophical scepticism. Clarendon Press, Oxford
44. Unger P. (1968). An analysis of factual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 65:157-170
45. Williams B. (1976). Moral Luck. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76:115-35
46. Williamson T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford
47. Wittgenstein L. (1969). On certainty. Blackwell, Oxford
48. Zagzebski L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK