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Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-269

Justification and the truth-connection

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EID: 84923822631     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139060097     Document Type: Book
Times cited : (250)

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