Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 227-246

  Chase, James ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 38849147860     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713659224     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980); H. Putnam, 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 215-271; T. Burge, 'Individualism and the Mental', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979), pp. 73-121
2. H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 7-17. Putnam's original presentation involves the distinct (and weaker) argument that the global sceptical hypothesis can never be truly asserted or thought, but he surely takes the argument above to be secured by this case, as D. Lewis suggests in 'Putnam's Paradox', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), pp. 221-236 at p. 234
3. For an assessment of Davidson's version of the argument, see P. Klein, 'Radical Interpretation and Global Scepticism', and C. McGinn, 'Radical Interpretation and Epistemology', both in E. LePore(ed.), Truth and Interpretation (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), at pp. 369-386 and 356-368 respectively
4. R. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966) presents an influential J-internalist position on which there is no a priori self-knowledge. E. Sosa, 'Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue', in E. Sosa (ed.). Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 225-244, at pp. 227-228 discusses an a priori introspective thesis as an optional component of his J-externalist theory
5. P. Boghossian, 'Content and Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Topics 17 (1989), pp. 5-26
6. See T. Burge, 'Individualism and Self-Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 649-663
7. See K. Falvey and J. Owens, 'Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism', Philosophical Review 103 (1994), pp. 107-137 at pp. 115-118, for a criticism (from the perspective of content externalism) of Boghossian's unstated assumptions here
8. At pp. 14-15, Boghossian expands the argument in this way. The more general argument is criticised on other grounds in T. Warfield, 'Privileged Self-Knowledge and Externalism are Compatible', Analysis 52 (1992), pp. 232-237, and P. Ludlow, 'Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory', Analysis 55 (1995), pp. 157-159. See also P. Ludlow, 'Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and the Prevalence of Slow-Switching', Analysis 55 (1995), pp. 45-49
9. Cf, for example, D. Lewis, 'Reduction of Mind', in Papers in Metaphysics and Episteinology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 291-324, and F. Jackson and P. Pettit, 'Some Content is Narrow', in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 259-282
10. A technical term four terms away from the primitive in Chisholm's definitional hierarchy, but perhaps the most obvious place at which justification of beliefs might come apart as a result of different wiring up. See R. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition, pp. 22-23 and p. 135
11. See especially A. Goldman, 'What is Justified Belief?', op. cit., pp. 116-118, and, more generally, the literature on the frame problem for reliabilism (for example, see J. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (London: Hutchinson, 1987), pp. 118-119)
12. See A, Goldman, 'The Internalist Conception of Justification', op. cit
13. A position similar to this seems to be what S. Sturgeon has in mind in his definition of epistemic internalism in 'The Gettier Problem', Analysis 53 (1993), pp. 156-164 at p. 159