Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-304

  Rupert, Robert D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive Systems; Computationalism; Embedded Cognition; Embodied Cognition; Embodiment; Extended Cognition; Extended Mind; Mental Content; Mental Representation; Situated Cognition

Indexed keywords

EID: 69449092401     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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