Belief-Forming Processes, Extended

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 2, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 741-765

  Palermos, Spyridon Orestis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861736536     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0075-y     Document Type: Article

References (65)

1. Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2008. The bounds of cognition. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
2. Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2010. Defending the bounds of cognition. In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
3. Audi, R. 1998. Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge. London: Routledge.
4. Bach-y-Rita, P., and S. W. Kercel. 2003. Sensory substitution and the human-machine interface. Trends in Cognitive Science 7(12): 541-546.
5. Burge, T. 1986. Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95: 3-45.
6. Burge, T. 1993. Content preservation. Philosophical Review 102: 457-488.
7. Clark, A. 1998. Magic words, how language augments human computation. In Language and thought: Interdisciplinary themes, ed. P. Carruthers and J. Boucher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Clark, A. 2001. Reasons, robots, and the extended mind. Mind and Language 16(2): 121-145.
9. Clark, A. 2006. Soft selves and ecological control. In Distributed cognition and the will, ed. D. Spurrett, D. Ross, H. Kincaid, and L. Stephens. Cambridge: MIT Press.
10. Clark, A. 2007. Curing cognitive hiccups: A defence of the extended mind. The Journal of Philosophy 104: 163-192. Also available at http://hdl. handle. net/1842/1719.
11. Clark, A. 2008. Supersizing the mind. Oxford University Press.
12. Clark, A. 2010a. Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extended. In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
13. Clark, A. 2010b. Coupling, constitution, and the cognitive kind: A reply to Adams and Aizawa. In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
14. Clark, A., and D. Chalmers. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58(1): 7-19.
15. Dretske, F. 1970. Epistemic operators. Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007-1023.
16. Faulkner, P. 2000. The social character of testimonial knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 97: 581-601.
17. Fricker, E. 1994. Against gullibility. In Knowing from words, ed. B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti, 125-161. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
18. Gettier, E. 1963. Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis 23: 121-123.
19. Goldman, A. 1976. Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73: 771-791.
20. Greco, J. 1999. Agent reliabilism. In Philosophical perspectives, 13: Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin, 273-296. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
21. Greco, J. 2004. Knowledge as credit for true belief. In Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology, ed. M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Greco, J. 2007. The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17: 57-69.
23. Greco, J. 2008. What's wrong with contextualism? The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 299-302.
24. Greco, J. 2010. Achieving knowledge: A virtue-theoretic account of epistemic normativity. Cambridge University Press.
25. Hume, D. 1977. In An enquiry concerning human understanding, ed. E. Steinberg. Indianapolis: Hackett.
26. Hurley, S. 1998. Consciousness in action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
27. Hurley, S. 2010. The varieties of externalism. In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
28. Kelp, C. (forthcoming). Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis.
29. Lackey, J. 2007. Why we do not deserve credit for everything we know. Synthese 158: 345-361.
30. Lackey, J. 2008. Learning from words: Testimony as a source of knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31. Lakatos, I. 1970. Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In Criticism and the growth of knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Cambridge University Press.
32. Logan, K. R. 2003. The extended mind: Understanding language and thought in terms of complexity and chaos theory. In Humanity and the cosmos, ed. Daniel McArthur and Cory Mulvihil. Also available at http://www. upscale. utoronto. ca/PVB/Logan/Extended/Extended. html.
33. Menary, R. 2006. Attacking the bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19(3): 329-344.
34. Menary, R. 2007. Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbound. Palgrave McMillan.
35. Menary, R. 2010a. Introduction: The extended mind in focus. In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
36. Menary, R. 2010b. Cognitive integration and the extended mind. In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
37. Noë, A. 2004. Action in perception. Cambridge: MIT Press.
38. Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
39. Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press.
40. Pritchard, D. H. 2002. Resurrecting the Moorean response to scepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10: 283-307.
41. Pritchard, D. H. 2008. Sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck epistemology. In The Oxford handbook of skepticism, ed. J. Greco. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
42. Pritchard, D. H. 2009. Knowledge. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
43. Pritchard, D. H. 2010a. Anti-luck virtue epistemology, manuscript, available at http://www. philosophy. ed. ac. uk/people/full-academic/duncan-pritchard. html.
44. Pritchard, D. H. 2010b. Knowledge and understanding. In The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, ed. A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
45. Pritchard, D. H. 2010c. Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis. Synthese 175: 133-151.
46. Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of "meaning". In Language, mind and knowledge, ed. K. Gunderson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
47. Reid, T. 1983. Essay on the intellectual powers of man. In Thomas Reid's inquiry and essays, ed. R. E. Beanblossom and K. Lehrer. Indianapolis: Hackett.
48. Roberts, T. Manuscript. Taking responsibility for cognitive extension.
49. Ross, D., and J. Ladyman. 2010. The alleged coupling-constitution fallacy and the mature sciences. In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
50. Rowlands, M. 1999. The body in mind: Understanding cognitive processes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
51. Rowlands, M. 2009. Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology 22(1): 1-19.
52. Rupert, D. R. 2004. Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101: 389-428.
53. Rupert, D. R. 2009. Cognitive systems and the extended mind. Oxford University Press.
54. Rupert, D. R. 2010. Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind? In The extended mind, ed. Menary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
55. Sosa, E. 1988. Beyond skepticism, to the best of our knowledge. Mind, New Series 97(386): 153-188.
56. Sosa, E. 1993. Proper functionalism and virtue epistemology. Nous 27(1): 51-65.
57. Sosa, E. 1999. How to defeat opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 141-154.
58. Sosa, E. 2000. Skepticism and contextualism. Philosophical Issues 10: 1-18.
59. Vaesen, K. forthcoming. Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition. Synthese.
60. van Gelder, T. 1995. What might cognition be, if not computation? The Journal of Philosophy 92(7): 345-381.
61. Varela, F. 1979. Principles of biological autonomy. New York: North-Holland.
62. Weiner, M. 2003. Accepting testimony. The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 256-264.
63. Wheeler, M. 2004. Is language the ultimate artifact? Language Sciences 26: 693-715.
64. Wilson, R. A. 2000. The mind beyond itself. In Metarepresentations: A multidisciplinary perspective, ed. D. Sperber, 31-52. New York University Press.
65. Wilson, R. A. 2004. Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences: cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press.