Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic angst

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 185-205

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747310534     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048400500110867     Document Type: Article

References (50)

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