Epistemological Disjunctivism

Epistemological Disjunctivism

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 1-192

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Assertion; Discrimination; Disjunctivism; Epistemic externalism; Epistemology; Evidence; Internalism; Knowledge; Mooreanism; Perception

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051938144     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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