Attacking the bounds of cognition

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 329-344

  Menary, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cognitive Integration; Cognitive Process; Conventional Content; Extended Mind; Intrinsic Content; The Parity Principle

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646908600     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: 1465394X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515080600690557     Document Type: Review

References (31)

1. Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2001). The bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 14, 43-64.
2. Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2006). Defending the bounds of cognition. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 45-48). Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
3. Baddeley, A. (2000). Short-term and working memory. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of memory (pp. 77-92). New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Ballard, D. (1991). Animate vision. Artificial Intelligence, 48, 57-86.
5. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
6. Clark, A. (2001). Reasons, robots, and the extended mind. Mind and Language, 16, 121-145.
7. Clark, A. (2003). Natural-born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and the future of human intelligence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
8. Clark, A. (2005). Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind. Analysis, 65, 1-11.
9. Clark, A. (2006). Memento's revenge: The extended mind extended. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 18-44). Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
10. Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7-19.
11. Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
12. Dretske, F. I. (1988). Explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
13. Fodor, J. A. (1990). A theory of content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
14. Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
15. Hurley, S. (1998). Consciousness in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
16. Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
17. Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1994). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic actions. Cognitive Science, 18, 513-549.
18. Menary, R. (in press). Cognitive integration: Attacking the bounds of cognition. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave.
19. Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
20. Millikan, R. G. (1993). White Queen psychology and other essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
21. Millikan, R. G. (2004). Varieties of meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
22. O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 939-973.
23. Rowlands, M. (1999). The body in mind: Understanding cognitive processes. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
24. Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1986). Schemata and sequential thought. In J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing (Vol. 2, pp. 7-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
25. Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy, 101, 389-428.
26. Sutton, J. (2006). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind, and the civilizing process. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind (pp. 234-297). Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
27. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
28. Webb, B. (1994). Robotic experiments in cricket phonotaxis. In D. Cliff, P. Husbands, J.-A Meyer, & S. Wilson (Eds.), From Animals to Animats 3: Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (pp. 45-54). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
29. Wertsch, J. (1985). Vygotsky and the social formation of mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
30. Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the cognitive world: The next step. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
31. Wilson, R. A. (2004). Boundaries of the mind: The individual in the fragile sciences-cognition. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.