McKinsey paradoxes, radical scepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments

Synthese

Volumn 130, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 279-302

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748272880     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014421800473     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Alston, William P.: 1986, 'Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology', Philosophical Topics 14, 181-204.
2. Boghossian, P.: 1989, 'Content and Self-Knowledge', Philosophical Topics 17, 5-26.
3. Boghossian, P.: 1997, 'What an Externalist can Know A Priori', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97, 161-175.
4. Bonjour, L.: 1980, 'Externalist Theories of Justification', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. K. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 27-52.
5. Brandom, R.: 1994, Making It Explicit, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
6. Brandom, R.: 1995, 'Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 895-908.
7. Brandom, R.: 1998, 'Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism', The Monist 81, 371-392.
8. Brown, J.: 1995, 'The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access', Analysts 55, 149-156.
9. Brueckner, A.: 1992a, 'Semantic Answers to Scepticism' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73, 200-219.
10. Brueckner, A.: 1992b, 'What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori', Analysis 52, 111-118.
11. Burge, T.: 1979, 'Individualism and the Mental', in P. French, T. Uehling and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 73-121.
12. Burge, T.: 1988, 'Individualism and Self-Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 85, 649-663.
13. Chisholm, R. M.: 1989, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
14. Davidson, D.: 1987, 'Knowing One's Own Mind', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60, 441-458.
15. Davies, M.: 1998, 'Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant', in C. Macdonald, B. Smith and C. J. G. Wright (eds), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 321-361.
16. DeRose, K.: 1995, 'Solving the Sceptical Problem', Philosophical Review 104, 1-52.
17. Dretske, F.: 1970, 'Epistemic Operators', Journal of Philosophy 67, 1007-1023.
18. Dretske, F.: 1971, 'Conclusive Reasons', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49, 1-22.
19. Evans, G.: 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
20. Forbes, G.: 1995, 'Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited', Journal of Philosophy 92, 205-222.
21. Fumerton, R.: 1988, 'The Internalism/Externalism Controversy', Philosophical Perspectives 2, 443-459.
22. Goldman, A.: 1980, 'The Internalist Conception of Justification', in P. A. French, T. E. Uehling and H. K. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
23. Goldman, A.: 1988, 'Strong and Weak Justification', Philosophical Perspectives 2, 51-69.
24. Goldman, A.: 1999, 'A Priori Warrant', Philosophical Perspectives 13, 1-28.
25. Hale, B.: 1999, 'Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism', (with Crispin Wright), in B. Hale and C. J. G. Wright (eds), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 427-457.
26. Hale, B.: 2000, 'Transmission and Closure: Some Comments on 'Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof' ', Philosophical Issues 10, 172-190.
27. Heller, M.: 1999, 'Relevant Alternatives and Closure', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, 196-208.
28. Hill, C.: 1996, 'Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, 567-581.
29. Kallestrup, J.: 2000, 'Incompatibilism and Natural Kind Terms', unpublished manuscript.
30. Lewis, D.: 1996, 'Elusive Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 549-567.
31. McKinsey, M: 1991, 'Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access', Analysis 51, 9-16.
32. Moore, G. E.: 1925, 'A Defence of Common Sense', in J. H. Muirhead (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy (2nd series), Allen and Unwin, London.
33. Moore, G. E.: 1939, 'Proof of an External World', Proceedings of the British Academy 25.
34. Nozick, R.: 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
35. Plantinga, A.: 1993, Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford University Press, New York.
36. Putnam, H.: 1975, The Meaning of "Meaning" ', reprinted in his Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, pp. 215-272.
37. Putnam, H.: 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
38. Pritchard, D.: 2000a, 'Closure and Context', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, 275-280.
39. Pritchard, D.: 2000b, 'Is "God Exists" a "Hinge" Proposition of Religious Belief?', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47, 129-140.
40. Pritchard, D.: 2000c, 'Scepticism and Dreaming', Philosophia 28, 36-52.
41. Pritchard, D.: 2000d, 'Wittgenstein, "Hinge" Propositions, & On Certainty', in B. Brogaard and B. Smith (eds), Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, Kirchberg, Austria, pp. 84-90.
42. Pritchard, D.: 2001, 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and "Hinge" Propositions', forthcoming in Wittgenstein-Studien.
43. Pryor, J.: 2000, 'Epistemology c. 1988-2000', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, 1-29.
44. Sainsbury, M.: 2000, 'Comments on Crispin Wright's 'Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof' ', Philosophical Issues 10, 191-200.
45. Sosa, E.: 1991, 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective', in his Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, pp. 270-293.
46. Sosa, E.: 1994, 'Philosophical Scepticism and Epistemic Circularity', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (supplementary vol.) 68, 263-290.
47. Sosa, E.: 1999, 'How to Defeat Opposition to Moore', Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141-154.
48. Suárez, A. G.: 2000, 'On Wright's Diagnosis of McKinsey's Argument', Philosophical Issues 10, 164-171.
49. Warfield, E.: 1998, 'A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing our Minds', Philosophical Studies 60, 76-90.
50. Williamson, T.: 2000, 'Scepticism and Evidence', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 613-628.
51. Wittgenstein, L.: 1969, On Certainty, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds), (tr.) D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford.
52. Wright, C.: 1985, 'Facts and Certainty', Proceedings of the British Academy 71, 429-472.
53. Wright, C.: 1991, 'Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon', Mind 397, 87-115.
54. Wright, C.: 1994, 'On Putnam's Proof that We Are Not Brains in a Vat', in B. Hale and P. Clark (eds), Reading Putnam, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 216-241.
55. Wright, C.: 1997, 'On the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference', (unpublished manuscript).
56. Wright, C.: 2000a, 'Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof', Philosophical Issues 10, 140-163.
57. Wright, C.: 2000b, 'Replies to Commentators', Philosophical Issues 10, 201-219.