Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis

Synthese

Volumn 175, Issue SUPPL. 1, 2010, Pages 133-151

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cognition; Cognitive ability; Epistemic luck; Epistemic virtue; Epistemology; Extended cognition; Knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956179687     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9738-y     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Adams F., Aizawa K. (2001) The bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14: 43-64.
2. Adams F., Aizawa K. (2008) The bounds of cognition. Blackwell, Oxford.
3. Chisholm R. (1977) Theory of knowledge. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
4. Clark A. (1998) Being there: Putting brain, body and world together again. MIT Press, Cambridge.
5. Clark A. (2007) Curing cognitive hiccups: A defense of the extended mind. Journal of Philosophy 104: 163-192.
6. Clark A. (2008) Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extended. In: Menary R. (eds) The extended mind. Ashgate Press, Aldershot.
7. Clark A., Chalmers D. (1998) The extended mind. Analysis 58: 7-19.
8. Cowart, M. (2006). Embodied cognition. In B. Dowden & J. Fieser (Eds.), Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Martin, TN: University of Tennessee. http://www. iep. utm. edu/e/embodcog. htm.
9. Gertler B. (2007) Overextending the mind?. In: Gertler B., Shapiro L. (eds) Arguing about mind. Routledge, London, pp 192-206.
10. Gettier E. (1963) Is justified true belief knowledge?. Analysis 23: 121-123.
11. Goldman A. (1976) Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 73: 771-791.
12. Goldman A. (1986) Epistemology and cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
13. Greco J. (1999) Agent reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 273-296.
14. Greco J. (2000) Putting skeptics in their place: The nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
15. Greco J. (2002) Knowledge as credit for true belief. In: DePaul M., Zagzebski L. (eds) Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
16. Greco J. (2007) The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17: 57-69.
17. Greco J. (2008) What's wrong with contextualism?. The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 416-436.
18. Greco J. (2009) The value problem. In: Haddock A., Millar A., Pritchard D. H. (eds) Epistemic value. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 313-321.
19. Haddock A., Millar A., Pritchard D. H. (2010) The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
20. Lackey J. (2007) Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know. Synthese 158: 345-361.
21. Lehrer K., Cohen S. (1983) Justification, truth, and coherence. Synthese 55: 191-207.
22. Menary R. (2006) Attacking the bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19: 329-344.
23. Menary R. (2007) Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
24. Menary, R. (eds) (2008) The extended mind. Ashgate Press, Aldershot.
25. Plantinga A. (1993a) Warrant and proper function. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
26. Plantinga A. (1993b) Warrant: The current debate. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
27. Pritchard D. H. (2005) Epistemic luck. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
28. Pritchard D. H. (2008a) Greco on knowledge: Virtues, contexts, achievements. The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 437-447.
29. Pritchard D. H. (2008b) Sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck epistemology. In: Greco J. (eds) The Oxford handbook of skepticism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 437-455.
30. Pritchard D. H. (2008c) Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck, revisited. Metaphilosophy 39: 66-88.
31. Pritchard, D. H. (2009a). Anti-luck virtue epistemology. Manuscript.
32. Pritchard D. H. (2009) Apt performance and epistemic value. Philosophical Studies 143: 407-416.
33. Rowlands M. (1999) The body in mind: Understanding cognitive processes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
34. Rowlands M. (2009) Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology 22: 1-19.
35. Rupert R. (2004) Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101: 389-428.
36. Sosa E. (1988) Beyond skepticism, to the best of our knowledge. Mind 97: 153-189.
37. Sosa E. (1991) Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
38. Sosa E. (2007) Apt belief and reflective knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
39. Vaesen, K. (2009). Knowledge without credit. Manuscript.
40. Zagzebski L. (1996) Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
41. Zagzebski L. (1999) What is knowledge?. In: Greco J., Sosa E. (eds) Epistemology. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 92-116.