The stag hunt and the evolution of social structure

The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-149

  Skyrms, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84924503282     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139165228     Document Type: Book

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