The evolution of conventions with mobile players

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 93-111

  Dieckmann, Tone ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND   (Ireland)

Author keywords

C72; D82; Evolution of conventions; Imperfect observability; Mobility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002428673     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00125-5     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Anderlini L., Ianni A. Path dependence and learning from neighbours. Games and Economic Behavior. 13:1996;141-177.
2. Anwar, A.W., 1996. When does Immigration Facilitate Efficiency?, University College London working paper.
3. Berninghaus, S.K., Schwalbe, U., 1996a. Evolution, Interaction and Nash equilibria, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 29, 57-86.
4. Berninghaus, S.K., Schwalbe, U., 1996b. Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 6, 297-312.
5. Bhaskar, V., Vega-Redondo, F., 1996. Migration and the Evolution of Conventions, University of Alicante discussion paper.
6. Binmore, K., Samuelson, L., 1994. Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection, SFB 303 Discussion Paper No. B-275, Universität Bonn.
7. Blume L. The Statistical mechanics of strategic interaction. Games and Economic Behavior. 5:1993;387-424.
8. Boyer R., Orléan A. How do conventions evolve? Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 2:1992;165-177.
9. Ellison G. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica. 61:1993;1047-1071.
10. Ellison, G., 1995. Basins of Attraction, Long-run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by-step Evolution, MIT working paper.
11. Ely, J., 1995. Local Conventions, University of California at Berkeley working paper.
12. Freidlin, M.I., Wentzell, A.D., 1984. Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems, Springer, New York.
13. Goyal S., Janssen M.C.W. Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination. Journal of Economic Theory. 77:1997;34-57.
14. Harsanyi, J.C., Selten, R., 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
15. Kandori M., Mailath G., Rob R. Learning, mutation, and long-run equilibria in games. Econometrica. 61:1993;29-56.
16. Kemeny, J.G., Snell, J.L., 1976. Finite Markov Chains, Springer, New York.
17. Oechssler J. Decentralization and the coordination problem. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 32:1997;119-139.
18. Robson A.J., Vega-Redondo F. Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching. Journal of Economic Theory. 70:1996;65-92.
19. Vega-Redondo F. Expectations, drift, and volatility in evolutionary games. Games and Economic Behavior. 11:1995;391-412.
20. Young P.H. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica. 61:1993;57-84.