Evolution of the social contract

Evolution of the Social Contract

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 1-148

  Skyrms, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

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EID: 84953296993     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139924825     Document Type: Book

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